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Sammendrag 
 
Denne oppgaven baseres på en kvalitativ studie av hvordan NCE Subsea, nærmere 
bestemt klyngens medlemmer samt den norske klyngemodellen, kan bidra til 
forskning og utvikling i den brasilianske leverandørkjeden av undervannsteknologi. 
Dunnings eklektiske paradigme er anvendt for å vurdere hvilken form for deltakelse 
som er mest hensiktsmessig for medlemmene av NCE Subsea.  
 
Den betydelige etterspørselen av utstyr og tjenester knyttet opp mot 
undervannsløsninger i Brasil har resultert i en bølge av nyetableringer i Rio de 
Janeiro. Disse selskapene bringer verdifull kunnskap og teknologi sårt trengt i den 
voksende klyngen. I den sammenheng vil fokus på DUI sannsynligvis være mer 
hensiktsmessig enn STI for å gradvis kunne løse flaskehalsene som preger den 
brasilianske virkeligheten, bl.a. som følge av en umoden leverandørkjede. 
 
Det er et klart bevis på selvseleksjon når bedriftene konfronteres med den 
"Brasilianske kostnaden". De mest krevende utfordringene er knyttet til mangel på 
kvalifisert arbeidskraft, logistikk, og det kompliserte skatteregimet. Studien 
konkluderer med at medlemmer av NCE Subsea bidra til å redusere gapet på 
etterspurt lokal kompetanse, spesielt ved å kvalifisere sjøfolk. Kvaliteten på lokalt 
produserte varer er fremdeles relativt dårlig, til tross for en helhetlig satsning på flere 
statlige nivåer for å oppnå lokalt innhold. Det er derfor grunn til bekymring for om 
den lokale kompetansen er tilstrekkelig til å absorbere mer avanserte innovasjonene 
som i økende grad vil utvikles i Rio de Janeiro i forbindelse med ulike 
samarbeidsavtaler. 
 
Triple Helix er et fornuftig verktøy for å utvikle den lokale subsea-industrien, og 
bygger på prinsipper som passer det brasilianske landskapet i større grad enn 
klyngemodellen som NCE Subsea representerer. Likevel kan visse karakteristika ved 
den norske klyngemodellen være gunstig for Rio Subsea Cluster. Funn tyder på at 
samarbeid mellom industri-akademia kan knyttes tettere dersom Rio Subsea Cluster 
trekker på norske erfaringer rundt gjennomføring av anvendte forsknings prosjekter . 
 
Oslo, Mai 2014 
Høgskolen i Oslo og Akershus, Fakultet for Samfunnsfag 
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Abstract 
The thesis undertakes a qualitative study of how NCE Subsea - the cluster members 
and the Norwegian NCE cluster model – can contribute to R&D in the Brazilian 
subsea supply chain. Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm is applied to determine the means 
of participation in the Brazilian subsea sector most beneficial to members of the NCE 
Subsea cluster.  
 
First of all, the great demand of subsea supplies and services has resulted in a surge of 
companies bringing much-needed technology to the emerging subsea hotspot, Rio de 
Janeiro. In this sense, DUI will perhaps prove more valuable than STI to gradually 
solve the many bottlenecks in the Brazilian subsea sector, partly caused by the 
immature supply chain. 
 
There is clear evidence of a self-selection process when confronted with the 
“Brazilian cost”. The most highlighted challenges relates to lack of qualified workers, 
logistics, and a complicated tax regime. The project concludes that members of NCE 
Subsea contribute to closing the gap of local competence, especially among qualified 
seafarers. The quality of local manufacturing is relatively poor, despite a holistic 
devotion to improve LC on several governmental levels.  One is therefore entitled to 
question, as Rio de Janeiro is becoming a hotspot for subsea technology, whether the 
local capabilities are sufficient to absorb more advanced innovations that increasingly 
will be developed in Rio de Janeiro in connection with various cooperation 
agreements. 
 
Triple Helix is a reasonable tool to develop the local subsea industry as it ”fits” the 
landscape to a greater extent than the NCE subsea cluster model does. However, 
certain features characteristic for the Norwegian cluster model might prove beneficial 
for the Rio Subsea Cluster. Findings indicate that the industry-academia linkage may 
become stronger if Rio Subsea Cluster draws on the Norwegian experiences of 
conducting applied science projects. 
 
Oslo, May 2014 
Oslo and Akershus University College, Faculty of Social Science 
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As suggested by a friend, my motto throughout this process has been “pretend to be 
writing to someone who is exceptionally intelligent, but have no knowledge of the 
subject”. Little did I know how useful this advice would become. An especial thanks 
to my supervisor, Helge Nordahl, for agreeing that we might as well “learn together” 
while I was exploring my field of study. Your sound advice, inputs and ability to give 
feedbacks on short notice, has proved very valuable for my work. 
 
Innovation Norway, inviting me to use your facilities while writing my thesis may 
seem like a small gesture from your side, but it proved crucial for my progress. Being 
surrounded by so many talented, helpful and welcoming people was truly an amazing 
experience. Flávia Ambrosano, and the rest of the team at the incubator office, it was 
a pleasure getting to know you all. I honestly cannot thank you enough. (Even the 
BodyTech-mafia for dragging me to the gym - there is nothing like a workout to clear 
the mind!) 
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Samordna Opptak deserves a roaring applause for selecting the best, first-graduating 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to Research Topic 
 
Brazil is anticipated to become the largest offshore market in the world for Norwegian 
vendors within this year, and until 2017. Norway is tagging closely behind as the 
second largest. Together, the markets will have a value exceeding USD 400 billions.  
The bilateral relationship between Brazil and Norway is particularly relevant in this 
context. In fact, Brazil is the third largest absorber of Norwegian Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), only surpassed by EU and the USA. The majority of the 
investments are by far inflows to the oil and gas sector with a strong focus on the rig 
and drilling services, subsea equipment and installation, and various types of offshore 
vessels. Statistics show a clear trend of accelerated activity after Petrobras discovered 
the first Pre-salt oil field in 2006, later named “Lula”. The Pre-salt basins, or “beneath 
the salt”, represents the Western Hemisphere’s biggest oil discovery in 30 years. It 
extends 800 kilometers along the Brazilian coast, is up to 200 kilometers wide, and 
estimated resources range from 50 to 90 billion barrels of hydrocarbons (oil plus 
natural gas). This alone makes Brazil one of the worlds most promising oil frontiers in 
its size and a key “laboratory” for developing Norwegian petroleum technology. 
 
Parallel to the development of the Brazilian oil sector, the bilateral collaboration 
between Brazil and Norway on a comprehensive plan has intensified. The Norwegian 
government’s Brazil-strategy outlines several areas in which a strategic partnership 
would prove mutually enriching and contribute to growth and development in both 
nations (Departementene, 2011). The collaborative program for R&D and human 
resources Brazil-Norway in the 21st century (BN21), was signed by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (SEDEIS) and The Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) in 2013. Through an explicable action plan, 
the parties gather effort in the development of jointly needed technologies within 
exploration, development and production of oil and gas. Such areas high on the 
agenda include subsea technology, enhanced oil recovery and drilling technology. 
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Recently, the State Government of Rio de Janeiro turned to NCE Subsea, a leading 
subsea cluster supported by the program Norwegian Centers of Expertise, for input 
and support in the formation of a local subsea cluster. A memorandum agreement was 
signed between the parties in 2013 with the object to facilitate new partnerships, 
encourage innovation and develop cutting-edge subsea technology in the region. 
 
Brazil and Norway have long ties of trade; ever since the bachalao norueges was 
unloaded at the docs of Rio de Janeiro around 170 years ago in return for sugar and 
coffee. Bearing this is mind, the industry has naturally initiated various agreements 
across business participants.  As an example, Aker Solutions started its activities in 
mining, paper and cellulose in Brazil back in the 70s. In the mid 90s, they opened 
their subsea unit in Curitiba, in the south of Brazil. Within the first ten years, Aker 
Solutions received orders for “Christmas trees”, subsea installments used to monitor 
the flow of oil out of the well, with a value of USD 500 million.  Today, they are 
established in Rio das Ostras, Rio de Janeiro and have a facility is under construction 
in Macaé - making Brazil the single market where Aker Solutions is investing the 
most (Inventure Management, 2013).  Statoil and the Brazilian national oil company, 
Petrobras, also serve as good examples.  Statoil is now the second largest operator in 
the Brazilian offshore market after Petrobras (although it only accounts for 3% of 
total production). A general agreement on strategic technological cooperation has 
been in vigor since October 2003, and several agreements for technological research 
and technology transfer are in force (Statoil, 2011). The companies have achieved 
synergy effects through information sharing and a common commitment to 
technology projects. Translated from Portuguese on the Statoil Brazil website one is 
informed, “The strategy of the Rio Research Center is based on the business needs of 
Statoil and technological opportunities in Brazil.” 
 
“The Norwegian model of R&D” in creating a national innovation system around the 
development on the Norwegian continental shelf, has been the basis for comparison 
used by policy makers and practitioners in many countries, and serves as a 
playground for strategists. Brazil is no exception. Norway’s success is partly due to 
the highly integrated R&D System of petroleum education and research that was 
introduced on several levels. Local content (LC) policies were strategically used as an 
instrument both for job creation and economic policy (Engen, 2007). Under the 
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“good-will” agreements introduced in 1979, international petroleum companies were 
rewarded by contracting with Norwegian firms, universities and research institutes for 
oil and gas related research and by developing Norwegian research centres. The 
operators’ contributions to domestic capacity building (financial support for R&D and 
transfer of know-how) were reflected in their standing in the next concession rounds. 
Tax deductions implied that the state covered up to 78% of the cost related to R&D. 
This led to a gradual learning process that supported expansion of Norwegian 
participation in the petroleum business parallel to an increasing ability to solve 
bottlenecks on the way.  As a result, clusters around the regional universities and 
research centers were created in collaboration with the national and foreign 
companies operating in Norway, primarily along the coast of Norway (Engen, 
2007:11).  Much credit is given to these policies for creating the valuable petroleum 
industry clusters present in Norway today. The question is if in two decades, 
Brazilians are able to look back and say the same. Discontent is expressed by the 
industry concerning the demanding LC levels claiming the requirements are numbing, 
rather than developing the local supply industry. 
 
The Brazilian government is finally shifting policies in favor of R&D investments by 
the private industry, realizing that heavy investments are needed to induce the 
network of equipment and service suppliers of the Brazilian oil and gas industry and 
in connection with extraction of the pre-salt oil. A recent presentation held by Luiz 
Antonio Elias, Deputy minister of SEDEIS, concludes that “Innovation is a permanent 
agenda for government and for the business sector. Innovation policies are top 
priority” (Elias, 2013). Traditionally, funding of research has been provided by 
federal means, and often channeled through public research institutions with limited 
connection to the industry. Statistics show a clear trend of increased R&D 
governmental expenditures, however contributions from the private sector are 
significantly lower compared to the OECD countries and the BRICS. As of 2005, 
licensee operators are legally bound to invest minimum 1% of gross revenues from 
the fields with special participation in R&D. Out of this amount, a minimum of 50% 
is contracted universities and institutes approved by the National Petroleum Agency 
(ANP). Instituto Sintef do Brasil – henceforth referred to as Sintef - was recently 
accredited access to this “Special Participation Fund”, which implies that Sintef may 
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be appointed to conduct projects funded through the “1%-rule” (Tønseth, 2013).  The 
remaining half may be spent in facilities owned by the concessionaire in Brazil (or 
contracted with national companies). This might contribute to narrowing the gap 
between research and appliance in the market due to Sintef’s ability to deliver 
innovations relevant for the company.  
 
A domestic technology push is led by Petrobras through an interactive process with its 
suppliers and cooperative efforts with research centers. Petrobras is claimed to induce 
innovative behavior among its suppliers (Oliveira, 2012). However, due to its 
dominant position in the market, the R&D is based on their needs of equipment and 
services rather than radical innovations that can largely be used by other companies 
and in other sectors of the economy.  Petrobras earmark heavy investments to its 
research centre, CENPES.  The commitment to R&D has led to a leading edge in 
deepwater technology, but it lacks the necessary supply chain around it. The benefit is 
mutual; international companies can gain knowledge and serve Petrobras, and 
Petrobras need oil service suppliers to meet their ambitious plans. It is established that 
developing the Pre-salt fields will demand R&D. Local authorities and Petrobras are 
lobbying Ilha do Fundão, an island north of Rio de Janeiro where the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) is situated, as the prime spot to conduct it. In 
addition to their gigantic research centre CENPES, one will also be impressed to find 
R&D centres of multinationals such as General Electrics (GE), Siemens, FMC 
Technologies, Baker Huges and Schlumberger on the island as well.  
 
 
1.2  Research Question 
 
Summarized, three aspects in which the potential for strengthening the relationship 
between Norway and Brazil within the subsea sector could prove complementary and 
beneficial are identified. These highlighted environments are;  
a) Financially – by attracting Norwegian firms to invest in the Brazilian subsea 
sector  
b) Technologically – by cooperation across and within universities, research 
centres, and research institutions in both countries, and  
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c) Institutionally – by drawing on the successful cluster experiences in 
developing a sustainable subsea supply industry in Norway (Guimarães, 
2012:66).  
 
Drawing on the above this paper seek to answer:  
 
“How can NCE Subsea contribute to research and development in the Brazilian 
subsea supply chain?” 
 
NCE Subsea will in this sense embody two aspects; 
1) The members of NCE Subsea 
2) The NCE Subsea cluster model 
 
 
1.3  Aim and Structure of the Paper 
 
The aim in this thesis is to present an admittedly crude model of the process that lead 
to two main outcomes in terms of R&D in the Brazilian subsea supply chain; Applied 
technology and Qualified workforce. There are also some indications that lead to a 
third element, transfer of technology, being amongst the contributions. The obvious 
starting point to resolve the research question would have been to analyze the scenario 
with, versus without, the members of the NCE Subsea present in the Rio de Janeiro 
area. Conducting such research would however be beyond my ability and the scope of 
this paper. It is therefore crucial to highlight that the findings in this thesis are neither 
to be understood as an isolated process, nor as direct effects of the other.   
 
This thesis is organized as follows. The next section will give an introduction to the 
subsea segment in its industry context and a definition of how NCE Subsea will be 
used as a generic term for what it embraces, its members individually and the cluster 
model it represents, rather than the actual organization as it is presented. Chapter three 
will outline some important framework backing up who, why and how Norwegian 
subsea suppliers could benefit from participation in the Brazilian subsea sector.  
These ideas are investigated by conducting semi-structural in-debt interviews with 
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representatives from relevant areas, enabling me to explore a broad picture of the 
overall perceived reality. The respective interview subjects and the methodological 
procedure are outlined in chapter four. 
 
The Analysis of Findings in Chapter five is divided into the three highlighted 
environments as identified above, namely Financially, Technologically and 
Institutionally. In Part A, the Brazilian reality is discussed in light of financial aspects, 
if and how participation is profitable. The scenario is briefly viewed from both 
perspectives; Brazilian incentives to attract and Norwegian incentives to participate. 
What becomes evident is that the decision to participate in R&D in Brazil is based on 
a time-quality-risk analysis. In Part B, we find that two core distinctions of the 
Norwegian Model of R&D – applied science and private contributions to R&D – are 
in fact two of the core shortcomings in the Brazilian. The cooperation and interaction 
is envisioned in a model designed by the author, inspired by the Triple Helix. The 
intention by doing this is to better present the possible movements in current overlaps 
caused mainly by “top down” formalizations enacted by the Brazilian government. 
The research cooperation described in Part B will be will be continued in Part C, 
allowing for exposure to the NCE Subsea cluster model. It has been claimed that the 
Norwegian model of cluster structure is not transferable as the Rio Subsea Cluster is 
in a different stage of development, however the author suspects that cultural aspects 
to a greater extent than structural, hinder the transferability. 
 
The final sector summarizes the arguments in the paper and presents, in accordance 
with the findings presented in the analysis, a simple model and its implications. The 
model is to be viewed as a conclusion of how NCE Subsea – its members and the 
underlying cluster model – can contribute to R&D in the Brazilian Subsea Supply 
Sector.  
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Chapter 2: The Subsea Service Sector 
 
2.1  Oil Service Companies  
 
Within the offshore petroleum sector, one distinguishes oil companies from the 
supply industry. Oil companies provide project management models related to oil 
production, and the supply industry that provides technical solutions for exploration 
and production activities. In this thesis, all these suppliers are referred to as oil service 
companies, defined as a company that provides oil and gas related products or 
services to the upstream oil and gas industry (Rystad, 2012).  They may deliver 
directly to the oil company or indirectly to other suppliers in the upstream petroleum 
sector. The market for oil service is very complex and it is important to understand 
the value chain in order to forecast the demand of the respective services. It is highly 
driven by the stage in which the region or field is undergoing.  Figure 1 below is 
helpful to comprehend which type of oil service provider is requested during the 
exploration, development and production phase.  
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Figure 1: The oil service segments’ position in the value chain. (Source: Rystad, 2012) 
 
For instance, Brazil is in the early stages of exploration the gigantic Santos Basin. 
Estimates for the total pre-salt resources vary (some say up to 90 billion barrels of oil, 
30 billion barrels more than the reserves found in the North Sea for comparison), but 
it is reasonable to predict that the extraction will require vast capital investments by 
the oil companies. Petrobras’ aggressive five-year Business and Management plan 
announce an exploration program with estimated investment of USD 220,6 billion 
(Petrobras, 2014). In this phase, one will naturally experience a huge demand for 
companies in seismic and geology, rigging and drilling services and well services. As 
a consequence, Rystad asserts that Brazil is the most important market for rigs and 
drilling services. Additionally, companies involved in the transportation and logistics 
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must be present to support the activities above. Brazil is currently experiencing an 
increasingly pressing lack of engineers to provide engineering services to the design 
and development of the fields. The deficit may cause a sincere obstacle at this current 
point in the value chain in-between exploration and development.  As the companies 
offering engineer services present the project, companies providing procurement and 
fabrication, installation of platforms, topsides and process equipment (drilling rig 
equipment) and subsea equipment and installations are demanded.  In this picture, 
there is no coincidence that subsea suppliers are strategically positioned in the Rio de 
Janeiro area to meet the demands related to the pre-salt development.  
 
Exploration and production in deep- and ultradeep waters spur the demand for rigs, 
which in turn leads to demand in topside and processing-equipment. When a field is 
in operation, it is mainly downhole drilling equipment and drilling services that is 
needed. It is important to note that the companies offering their services in an 
exploration phase is important throughout the entire value chain by providing 
maintenance.  
 
 
2.1.1 Five Highlighted Areas 
 
 
"Pre-salt area constraints are not financial, technological or administrative. The 
restrictions are in the pace that the supply chain needs to deliver everything the pre-
salt requires"     
José Sergio Gabrielli, Former Director of Petrobras1 
 
Keeping the phase of the Brazilian oil market and the oil service segments’ position in 
the value chain in mind, it probably makes sense to shortly describe the relationship 
between Brazilian and Norwegian oil service industry on a more firm-specific level, 
to get an idea to what extent it affects R&D in Brazil. According to CEO of INTSOK, 
Gulbrand Wangen, five technological areas should be highlighted in which the 
Norwegian oil service suppliers are heavily involved in the Brazil.  These segments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Valor Econômico. São Paulo, 10 September 2009. 2	  As defined by ANP, an operator is the company legally appointed the rights and responsibilities to 
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are Floating Production System and Offloading (FPSO), Maritime sector, Drilling rigs 
construction, Drillship operation and Subsea technology (Wangen interview).  
 
Wangen report that 25% of all offshore vessels in the Brazilian Maritime sector are 
Norwegian controlled. Within the scope of supplies, Dynamic Positioning (DP) is one 
example of Norwegian expertise in operating offshore vessels, highly relevant in 
Brazil. By applying DP systems, vessels (or drilling rigs) are kept within specified 
position and heading limits. These motor systems are designed to minimize fuel 
consumption and wear and tear on the propulsion equipment (Kongsberg, 2014). 
Kongsberg Maritime employ substantial expertise and experience in developing and 
delivering cutting-edge DP systems and was this year appointed by Petrobras to 
deliver full range technology packages for ten new pipe laying vessels.  The contract 
is reportedly worth USD 19.85 million and represents purely a ”sale of technology” 
from a Norwegian firm to Brazil.   
 
Substantial potential for cooperation lay within the segment of Drilling rigs 
construction. As quoted by Jørgen P. Rasmussen, chairman of Seadrill, “Norway is 
the oil industry's equivalent of Silicon Valley. Nowhere else has there been developed 
so much advanced technology for use in wells” (Steensen, 2010). LMG Marin, 
headquartered in Bergen, won in 2012 a substantial contract worth over NOK 200 
million to design 14 (out of 28) drill ships for Petrobras in the world’s largest 
construction program of its kind named Sete Brasil. Other Norwegian suppliers are 
also involved in the Sete program. Transpetro has designated two companies as 
"preferred suppliers" of drilling packages; Aker Solutions and the Norwegian branch 
of the U.S. National Oilwell Varco. Consequently, as highlighted by Wangen, the two 
Kristiansand-based providers have been awarded contracts for six and seven drill 
packages respectively. 
 
Drillship operation is mentioned as the fourth area. Norwegian-based operator 
Odfjell Drilling will operate six of the 14 ships, and Seadrill will be responsible for 
three.  Odfjell Drilling has since 2006 been involved in designing, planning and 
constructing four drilling units for ultra deep water, including Deepsea Metro II for 
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Petrobras in 2011. Its future involvement is settled, as it will be operating 20% of 
three rigs constructed in the Sete project2. 
 
FPSO is a floating vessel used for the processing of hydrocarbons and for storage of 
oil. FPSOs have been used by Petrobras since the 70s for the exploration of the oil 
reserves in Campos Basin and is a concept very familiar to Norwegian firms such as 
Aker Solutions and One Subsea. The vessels are particularly useful in remote or deep-
water locations, and are used and demanded in a large scale nowadays. In terms of 
control and field operators as shown in Figure 4, Petrobras is dominating, with 15 
operative and 12 in order, according to the International Maritime Associates (2014). 
The projects planned, such as the Libra FPSO charter, represents a great opportunity 
for Norwegian oil service operators to not only win the contracts, but also to influence 
the specifications for the future vessels ordered by Petrobras (Interview Wangen). At 
a workshop arranged by INTSOK in March 2014, their members were invited to 
present their products. If Petrobras agrees to set their specifications for the FPSOs 
according to the Norwegian proposals, it would clearly represent a technological 
transfer from Norwegian-based companies to Brazil, adjusted to operate offshore 
Brazil. 
 
Brazil and Norway set the benchmark within Subsea technology worldwide. The 
major Norwegian-linked firms such as DOF Subsea, Aker Solutions and FMC 
Technology, are all established in Rio de Janeiro with a long-term commitment. The 
figure below briefly presents two main points; that Brazil is already a significant 
player, with sensational expected growth. As mentioned in the introduction, Brazil is 
a key market for Aker Solution’s subsea technology and is heavily involved with a 
strategy to deliver high levels of LC. Just this April, Aker Solutions announced 
though its website that Petrobras awarded the company a USD 300 million worth 
subsea contract for manifolds in the pre-salt field with the first delivery scheduled in 
2016. Local manufacturing facilities cover a certain part of the company’s product 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  As defined by ANP, an operator is the company legally appointed the rights and responsibilities to 
execute all operations of an oil field, while the contractor is delivering products or services to the 
operator. Brazil currently has a mixed regulatory framework of Concession contracts and Production-
Sharing Contracts (PSCs).   
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line, and are currently expanding to include more equipment to reduce import, to 
exemplify subsea control systems will soon be produced locally (Dunaeva, 2013). 
FMC Technology is headquartered in Huston, but have strong ties to Norway after the 
acquisition of Kongsberg Offshore (Kongsberg Groups underwater technology 
division) from Siemens in 1993. They have already received four orders for subsea 
manifolds in the Pre-salt field (FMC, 2013). According to information on their 
website, approximately 50% of all oil and gas produced offshore Brazil passes 
through FMC Technologies’ equipment. They have local employees throughout two 
manufacturing facilities in Rio de Janeiro and their subsea services base in Macaé. 
Both Aker Solutions and FMC Technology have established research centers in Rio 
de Janeiro. Bergen-based DOF Subsea holds substantial contracts with partners such 
as Technip and Chevron. The company is, together with its sister company Norskan, 
positioned to deliver high-standard vessels with advanced technology and the latest 
subsea equipment. The operator’s core activities are project management and other 
ongoing services. Consequently, DOF Subsea is highly dependent on a competent 
workforce and there fore contributes actively to develop the local know-how. Subsea 
7 (British) and Technip (French) hold significant contracts in the Brazilian market, 
and much of their subsea competence is located in Norway. However, their turnover 
in Brazil is not included in the reported international turnover as Headquarters are 
located outside of Norway. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Brazil’s share of installed Deepwater subsea equipment and FPSOs, 2012 and 2020. 
(Source: IEA) 
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2.2  The Subsea Service Segment 
 
Figure 3 and 4 are INTSOK’s overview of the Norwegian “world-class clusters”, and 
the potential Brazilian “world-class clusters”.  To concentrate the thesis, it was natural 
to focus on the subsea service segment. It is reasonable due to several observations 
highlighting economic, technological and institutional relationship. Subsea 
technology encompasses everything between sea surface and seabed that is related to 
the extraction of oil and gas resources. First of all, the webpage Offshore.no proclaim 
that Petrobras is, and is expected to remain, one of the largest customers for subsea 
services. Of the total turnover for Norwegian oil service companies in Brazil in 2012, 
23% came from subsea equipment and installation (Rystad Energy, 2013:18). The 
industry is fairly scattered consisting of a bundle of large companies, and a range of 
small and medium niche-like firms delivering essential technology to the oil 
companies or other oil service companies. It is important to note that Norwegian 
bound oil service companies in this thesis include Brazilian subsidiaries, although 
these account as Brazilian companies in practice (please see footnote 5 for details). 
Collectively, Norway provides world-leading solutions within the subsea segment 
with a global marked share of 73% (Fiksdahl interview).  Extensive exploration and 
early development projects along Brazil’s coastline will subsequently demand a 
significant amount of subsea-equipment and installations, implying large potential 
gains for Norwegian suppliers if positioned in the market. It is a highly technical 
field, and contracts are won by the best technology solutions to a greater extent than 
price. The competitiveness of the Norwegian subsea industry is claimed to be a 
consequence of targeted R&D policies involving universities, research milieus and 
incentives for industry participation. It is argued that the immaturity of such a 
network of equipment and service suppliers represent a bottleneck of the Brazilian oil 
and gas sector (Olivieira, 2012). The question is weather the Norwegian experiences 
and suppliers might enrich the current dynamics. 
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Figure 3: Norwegian «World-Class Clusters». (Source: INTSOK, 2013) 
 
Figure 4: Potential Brazilian «World-Class Clusters». (Source: INTSOK, 2013).  
 
A distinction is usually made between development of shallow- or deep-waters  
because different facilities and approaches for subsea technologies and production 
systems are required3.  Recovery from offshore fields in general and deepwater fields 
in particular, is technologically very demanding. Deeper water and subsea technology 
go in pair, as the sector in its essence is always seeking new, innovative solutions for 
deeper waters and more demanding conditions.  Hence, the two oil-nations face 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  International Energy Agency define deepwater as water with a depth in excess of 400 
meters	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similar challenges on deep-water, but this also represent areas of possible synergies 
and cooperation.  Petrobras has over the past decades developed leading technology 
capabilities in the area of deep-water exploration and production (E&P), an area in 
which Norwegian companies possesses technology, competence and experience from 
the northern sea. Over the past five years, 50% of new discoveries of oil worldwide 
were made in deep water areas. 63% of these discoveries is found on Brazilian shelf 
(Petrobras, 2012). It has therefore been stated that Brazil could become a “laboratory” 
for further development of offshore subsea technology.  
 
The top three receivers of Norwegian subsea supplies are Great Britain, Brazil and 
USA, which can partly be understood by the similar geographic, and climatic 
challenges as faced in the North Sea.  As the graph of the Brazilian subsea market 
below clearly illustrate, the growth in subsea spending has been tremendous, and the 
trend is expected to continue4. Large projects conducted by Petrobras drive the 
forecasted value of the subsea market to reach USD 12 billion by 2017. The market 
for subsea services are expected to grow from USD 900 million to USD 1.7 billion in 
the period 2013-2017 partly led by the need for subsea infrastructure to be connected 
to the FPSO installments. The sub-segments subsea equipment and SURF5 are the 
most important segments for Norwegian actors and is described as services related to 
the installation of subsea equipment.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Please note that international revenue from Norwegian subsea service firms can mainly 
come from one of two sources: Directly from Norway via exports, or sales through foreign 
subsidiaries. The sum of the two sources makes up the international sales. When the parent 
company is Norwegian, the sales come from either the Norwegian units’ export, the 
Norwegian subsidiary established abroad, or subsidiaries that are acquired abroad. When the 
parent company is foreign, but the firm has a Norwegian subsidiary, will exports from the 
Norwegian subsidiary be included. 
5 Subsea Umbilicals, Risers and Flowlines. 	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Figure 5: Subsea market –Brazil. (Source: INTSOK Annual Market Report 2012). 	  
2.3 Local Content in the Brazilian Oil Service Sector 
 
It is expected that the role of the Norwegian based companies for R&D in Brazil is 
affected by LC requirements and thus relevant to give a short introduction to the 
topic.  The term local content refers to the use of domestic goods and services and the 
Brazilian law requires a minimum amount of local content and participation in all 
projects and operations. The policies deal with the following elements; 
 1. Purchase of material, equipment, machinery and domestic made consumer 
goods6 2. Contracting of local service providers  3. Transfer of technology 4. Restriction of the use of workers formed by expatriated to enhance local 
workforce7 (BNDES, 2010; p. 30). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The mandatory local content of equipment ranges from 37-59% (Rodrigues,Napolitano,Paduan, 2013) 
7 The Ship Owners’ Association relate to requirements that dictate 2/3 of crew must be Brazilian within 
one year of operation, many reports up to 100% local crew. (DOF, Ship Owners’ Association and 
Fiksdahl interview).	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The current process could result in establishment of a local network of suppliers of 
equipment and services (Olivieira, 2012). One way of seizing this opportunity is 
through Prominp, a program that lay out the plan for maximization of participation of 
domestic industry in providing goods and services.  Its motto is clear; “Everything 
that can be done in Brazil must and will be done in Brazil” (Prominp, 2013).   
 
One can hardly disagree that LC can be a sustainable tool for local based job creation, 
knowledge and technology transfer and industry development, given that the local 
content is based on principles to enhance competitiveness (Paul, 2013 and Fiksdahl 
interview). The case of Norway can testimony the effects. In Brazil, the purpose of 
the policies is beyond building just an oil industry. It also aims at stimulating broad-
based social and economic development, through measures such as upgrading of 
infrastructure and improved education.  
 
Practically, it forces the multinational companies to produce locally and hire local 
workers. The aspiration is to achieve local ownership and participation in different 
parts of the value chain, known as the concept of local value-add (Paul, 2013). 
Norwegian companies are generally expressing devotion to deliver LC, and there are 
examples of projects surpassing the required percentage, as presented at the seminar 
“How to achieve LC” in 2013. This may also be strategically beneficial in terms of 
stronger positioning as fulfillment of LC gives preferential rights in the market. 
 
 
2.4  NCE Subsea 
 
NCE Subsea is one of the 12 Norwegian Centers of Expertise (NCE), which is a 
governmentally funded cluster program within various industries. This knowledge 
hub is geographically located in Bergen – “the subsea capital” - on the west coast of 
Norway (NCE, 2014a). 
 
NCE Subsea was established as an industrial cluster in 2006 and consists today of 
around 130 businesses and organizations, employs approximately 8000 people, and 
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reports a yearly turnover of nearly NOK 20 billion8, according to information on the 
their website. The central partners for the industry worth highlighting are FMC 
Technologies, Aker Solutions, Vetco Aibel, Cameron and Statoil’s Tool Pool 
(Steensen, 2010).  Additionally, several SMEs suppliers work to deliver to these 
companies. Researchers are also involved though links to Sintef and the University 
College in Bergen. The cluster shall contribute to innovation in the Bergen-region by 
providing financial and academic support in establishments of development projects 
within the subsea industry.  
 
NCE is funded and administered in cooperation with Innovation Norway, The 
Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA) and the Research Council of 
Norway. The clusters, defined as  ”A geographic concentration of related enterprises 
and institutions within an industry, a technology or value chain”, get technical and 
financial support for up to ten years. Hence, NCE aim to contribute to the 
development of clusters, as mature clusters by nature are self-sufficient.  
The mantra of the Norwegian cluster model is to “cooperate when you can and 
compete when you must”, and the basic idea is that the companies in a cluster identify 
their common problems and work together to solve them. In addition to structural 
qualities such as vertical and horizontal links as further explained in the theory 
section, Jacobsen (2008) argues that there are other important factors that enhance the 
cluster. The most important are external links, allocation of resources, education and 
research participants, cluster identity and reputation, and the role as facilitator. 
NCE Subsea act in ways that benefit the group as a whole, and its role as a facilitator 
can be in four areas; as host, seller, connector and gardener (Jacobsen, 2008). It acts 
as a hostess in providing service needed for businesses in the group. The seller part is 
about actively promoting the geographical area to investors, companies and 
competent individuals. The connector organizes forums and actively creates a 
platform to connect the players in the community and with stakeholders outside the 
cluster. The final role, as a gardener, is to facilitate germination and emergence of 
other new, innovative businesses, for example in the form of an incubator office. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  1	  USD=5,935	  Norwegian	  Krone	  as	  of	  May	  18th	  2014	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NCE Subsea is an internationally leading competence and production environment 
and the cluster contributes to raise international commitment in the Norwegian subsea 
industry. External links with participants outside the business group, both in Norway 
and in the rest of the world, is a prerequisite for the business group’s productivity and 
long-term development capability. The Norwegian government stimulates increased 
R&D cooperations between members, R&D cooperation between members and 
universities, and other research institutions, as well as strengthening competitiveness 
internationally. Especially for small companies that lack sufficient expertise and 
resources, the NCE Subsea membership will give these companies access to markets 
they might otherwise struggle to break into. This kind of facilitation and promotion to 
internationalization is of such importance that it is currently undergoing a 
transformation from NCE to “Global Centre of Expertise” (GCE). 
 
Cooperation between the local suppliers was limited before the establishment in 2006, 
and the NCE program has created an identity and network that previously did not 
exist (Econ Pöyry, 2009). Resource sharing and transfer between companies is one 
way to obtain external economies of scale. On the Coast Center Base in Ågotnes 
shared test-facilities and workshops for subsea equipment are one example how to 
apply this idea.  
Knowledge and innovation is at the core of theory on industry cluster. Naturally do 
R&D-milieus, universities, and research centers play a crucial role in fostering 
knowledge accumulation locally and through its international contacts in the global 
forefront of knowledge. NCE Subsea have close ties with education and research 
participants such as Sintef and the University College in Bergen (HiB). The industry 
in collaboration with HiB have established a Bachelor degree and two Master 
programs in underwater technology. These graduates can play an important role for 
cluster learning by adding new competencies and knowledge during their studies and 
as newly educated employees. 
It is important to understand what NCE Subsea represents in this thesis. Two points 
must be clarified:  
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Firstly, NCE Subsea represents 130 large and SMB directly or indirectly connected to 
the subsea service industry. An actor valuable in the NCE Subsea is not necessarily 
needed in the supply chain connected to Rio de Janeriro. An analysis of the members 
“fit” in the Brazilian subsea supply chain on a detailed level will not be made, nor 
does NCE Subsea hold accurate statistics on members that are delivering to the 
Brazilian market. Hence, NCE Subsea is only to be viewed as a representative section 
of the Norwegian based subsea industry and how this industry, broadly, may 
contribute to the development of the Brazilian R&D subsea supply chain. Secondly, 
NCE Subsea is representative as an example of how the Norwegian cluster model 
works in practice. It is not preconditioned that it is a “better” or “worse” method of 
developing the industry. The NCE Subsea program have however showed positive 
results in terms of interlinked activities and total growth, independently and 
collectively (Econ Poyry, 2009 and Menon, 2012). 
 
2.5  NCE Subsea and Subsea Rio Cluster 
 
The state of Rio de Janeiro, put forward by SEDEIS, has turned to NCE Subsea on 
assistance in the modeling and managing of the newly formed Subsea Rio Cluster. 
The local authorities are eager to learn from NCEs experiences, and are confident that 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) will lead to a privileged position for 
Norwegian subsea companies in Brazil. The dominating members in NCE Subsea 
already have affiliates in Brazil, such as FMC Technology, Aker Solutions, DOF 
Subsea, GE, and Sintef. The main objectives are listed below; 
1. To promote technological cooperation between enterprises of both countries, 
primarily SMEs 
2. To facilitate partnerships between Brazilian and Norwegian enterprises, in the 
development of new products, processes or services 
3. To implement actions to promote increasing competitiveness of SME s in 
Norway and Brazil and their internationalization through international 
cooperation and technology transfer 
4. To collaborate in promoting the national innovation systems of both countries 
and exchange experiences in managing innovation and managing public and 
private resources (NCE Subsea, 2014). 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1  Global Expansion Theory 
 
”Globalization occurs when multinational enterprises engage in foreign direct 
investment to create subsidiaries which add value across national borders.”  
Rugman, 2002 
 
Empirical research and an extensive amount of international literature show that 
exporting firms are on the average more productive than non-exporting firms, and that 
the exports as such helps to increase productivity (Wagner, 2011, Reve and Jakobsen, 
2001).  Exporting firms have to bear extra cost related to market research, adaption of 
products to meet local requirements, transportation and to overcome cultural barriers 
– just to name a few. Some experts also argue that salary expenses are higher in 
exporting firms (Bernard, Bradford and Lawrence, 1995).  Following this reasoning, 
only the best companies manage to overcome these barriers. Hence, through the 
circumstances of self-selection only the most productive firms become exporters and 
less productive producers simply do not have resources to spare for 
internationalization.  
 
The self-selection continues ex post as internationally oriented companies often 
experience harder competition, which means that they increasingly need to be able to 
adapt by cutting costs. As exporting companies have access to a broader network of 
contacts, they may capture the technological or market changes faster. This gives 
them a better basis for innovation and adaptation of production.  Lastly, one aspect of 
achieving economies of scale is the ability to allocate fixed costs on more units, and it 
thus increases the incentives to invest in R&D. Hence, only the good go abroad, and 
only the best stay (Menon, 2013).  According to figures from Rystad Energy, the 
largest Norwegian companies have a high degree of internationalization. By sorting 
oil service companies according to international turnover, one finds that the top-20 
account for a total of NOK 143 billion in 2012, or three quarters of the international 
turnover. This equals to 68% of sales revenues that is coming from international 
business, whereas the percentage for the remaining companies have only 17%. It is 
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worth noting that many suppliers further down the chain have all of its income from 
other Norwegian oil service companies (Rystad Energy, 2013:17).  
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) occur when a citizen, organization or firm invest 
directly in an economy other than that of the investor with the objective of obtaining a 
lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy.  The basic criterion 
defined by IMF is a ownership of at least 10% of the voting power, representing a 
significant influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise.  Any inflow 
less than that is characterized as a portfolio investment. From the quote above we 
interpret that the economic phenomena FDI also captures socio-political changes and 
globalization processes. Hence, FDI must be understood beyond the transfer of 
capital, and rather as a complex composition and transmission of capital, knowledge 
and labor.  
 
Trends in FDI signal that emerging markets attract more FDI than ever before, and 
has bypassed developed economies.  Building on theories on trade and 
internationalization, the focus is directed towards multinational corporations’ (MNCs) 
motivation for international production. Several types of market imperfections can 
explain FDI decisions, such as patent protection, imperfect competition, and 
achieving economies of scale.  In this thesis, IMF’s definition will be applied and the 
focus will be on FDI inflows and its relation to R&D in the subsea sector receiving 
the investment; the host country Brazil.   
 
Theory focuses on three perspectives:  
 
1. Why FDI is favored as opposed to other forms of internationalization such as 
exporting and licensing.  
2. Why firms in the same industry often undertake FDI at the same time and why 
they favor the same localization.  
3. The Eclectic Paradigm tries to combine the two into a single holistic 
explanation (Hill, 2011) 
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3.1.1   The Eclectic Paradigm – OLI Framework 
 
The British economist Dunning is known for his eclectic paradigm. The framework is 
widely used for analyzing why, where and how MNCs undertake FDI as opposed to 
exporting or licensing use of their brand or product to foreign producers or sellers. 
The OLI acronym represents Ownership, Location and Internalization advantages that 
justify the FDI. Together, this tripod explains the scope and geography of value added 
activities by companies (Hill, 2011).  
 
Firstly, there must be some ownership advantage of a specific asset, tangible or 
intangible, that enables the firm to lower cost or increase the price of their goods or 
services. The precondition to make investments abroad is naturally that these benefits 
exceed the inconveniences that may accrue from cultural and language barriers, and 
the fact that the foreign company does not have as good knowledge about markets and 
regulations as the local actors.  
 
Additionally, a firm may capture location-specific advantages by utilizing resource 
endowments or assets that combined with its own unique assets, create value 
(Dunning, 1988). Location factors are typically separated into economic, political or 
social/cultural advantages. An obvious example of economic advantage is the 
exploration and extraction of natural resources, which explain the heavy FDI in the oil 
industry. This is referred to as horizontal FDI, i.e. when MNEs produce the same 
product in multiple plants and service local market through affiliate production (Wit 
and Meyer, 2010).  Vertical FDI, on the other hand, is characterized by 
decentralization of the firm’s production chain to realize arbitrage on quantities or 
qualities of factors of production.   
 
Internalization suggest that there are advantages to carry out certain activities 
internally within the company, because not doing so would generate a high risk of 
losing ownership advantage, for example loosing proprietary knowledge to potential 
competitors. Even if the production is more profitable in the host country, it does not 
mean that the firm must own facilities.  Rather, a local company could produce under 
license, or enter into management contracts or alliances with shared control.  If such 
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renunciation of control implies diminishing value for the business as a whole, an 
internalization advantages to conduct FDI is present. 
 
For Norwegian subsea companies, these factors are highly relevant to consider; 
 
(O)  The firms typically control key resources such as intellectual property and 
capabilities. Theories of internationalization argue that FDI is a favorable alternative 
to licensing because the high-tech subsea firms run the risk of giving away valuable 
know-how to a potential competitor (Hill, 2011). Potentially as hazardous is loosing 
control over manufacturing, marketing, and strategy in the foreign market. Such 
capabilities are not amenable to licensing and the competitive advantage may 
therefore be lost. Owning local subsidiaries also gives access and priority to various 
funding programs for R&D such as the “BNDES Petroleum & Gas” and FINEP’s 
“Innova Petro”.  The largest companies are naturally more widespread in the use of 
subsidiaries abroad and many multinational subsea suppliers will delivered finished 
goods by a combination of deliveries directly from Norwegian as well as foreign 
subsidiaries (Rystad Energy, 2013).  
 
(L)  Out of the 189 countries compared on the "Ease of Doing Business", Brazil is 
ranked as number 116 (The World Bank, 2014). Unattractive factors such as high 
import tariffs, an extensive bureaucracy and one of the world’s most heavy LC regime 
have obvious deterrent effects. As will be discussed later, the Brazilian business 
landscape presents challenges that are difficult to manage remotely. Agents not 
familiar with the complexity of Brazilian processes and culture might prove both 
costly and fatal. On the other hand, agents or contractors who are familiar with the 
local market but do not represent the company’s identity, might also result in 
unpleasant surprises.  Regardless, Brazil will throne as the world’s biggest offshore 
market, and the demand for subsea services and equipment is an undeniable result of 
Petrobras’ ambitious investment plans.  
 
In accordance with local policies, you cannot obtain local content without having a 
subsidiary in Brazil, nor qualify most goods and services for the Petrobras Master 
Vendor list and other supplier registries (as elaborated in section 5.A2) (Inventure 
Management, 2013). Vendors in this list are automatically qualified for Petrobras’ 
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projects, which is claimed to be a great advantage. Additionally, only companies with 
local entities may present a letter of interest or “business plan” to the several funding 
programs available in Brazil. For a number of the Norwegian SMEs delivering 
products and services to Petrobras and Brazil, their part of the major projects are so 
small that the main contractor include them in the international supply part of the 
project, and thereby bypass the LC requirements. 
Due to the factors explained above combined with the Brazilian cost, Brazil is not 
necessarily the market of choice. On the other hand, some of these arguments, such as 
the local content regime, risk of dissipation of knowledge and the resource-bound 
nature of upscale oil, stem in favor of FDI.  
 
 
3.1.2   FDI as a Catalyst for Development 
 
Analyzes of correlation between capital inflows and domestic growth in host country 
has been the object of many studies. The Washington Consensus holds, in broad 
terms, that FDI flows will generate positive externalities for domestic firms 
(UNCTAD. Hill, 2011). Particularly in large-scale extraction projects, foreign capital 
inflows could be essential to overcome financial constraints. The foreign actors share 
the risks associated with exploration and extraction of oil and may provide access to 
global markets. Washington Consensus has been raised for its focus on the quantity 
rather than the quality of FDI.  Besides capital, the source of growth generally come 
in form of technology and expertise which in turn may generate growth through four 
activities; employment, exports, increasing competitive pressure in local market and 
externalities or spillovers (Scott-Kennel, ). Central to the research is to value the 
spillovers of FDI, i.e. the benefits to the host economy beyond what can be captured 
by the foreign investor himself. A recent study revealed that an FDI inflow to the 
offshore industries in Norway is a greater source of synergy in the knowledge-based 
developments of the western regions than the university environments in Trondheim 
and Oslo (Leydesdorff, 2012).  
 
Two different kinds of “spillovers” can be defined. One is the effect of knowledge 
flows being transferred from the MNC to its subsidiary, “leaked” in the host economy 
and absorbed/acquired by the domestic firms. The other is the increased competition 
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in the local market led by as the affiliate’s competitive advantage caused by superior 
knowledge inputs.  This may influence domestic firms to increase productivity 
regardless of knowledge spillovers from MNCs.  
 
3.1.3   FDI as an Obstacle for Development 
 
 
Experts and empirical evidences are dispersed; while some encourage FDI as a source 
of economic growth, others view it as a threat to development in less developed host 
economies. In fact, very little evidence exists to support economic effects arising from 
FDI-related spillovers, at least in a wide range (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2002). Research 
conducted by Borenztein, Gregorio and Lee (1998) found that FDI contribute 
relatively more to growth than domestic investment, except in countries with the 
lowest levels of schooling. Robust findings indicate that the FDI in interaction with a 
stock of human capital below a certain threshold will have a negative effect on overall 
domestic growth. Countries with strong absorptive capacities, such as infrastructure, 
local financial markets or an efficient industrial sector, are those with the highest 
intensity and magnitude of technological upgrading and potential for capability 
development (Wong, 1992; Ozawa, 1992; Blomström and Kokko, 2001).   
 
Several case studies from extractive industries conclude that in markets with 
imperfect competition, FDI may cause local firms to loose market share. Dependency 
theorists point out that foreign companies’ tight control over technology, superior 
management techniques and export channels prevent spillovers and create 
monopolies.   
 
Spillovers are expected to be less in resource-seeking activities as opposed to 
manufacturing FDI due to its high capital and technology intensity and limited 
timeframe (Farole and Winkler, 2014). Manufacturing, being more labor-intensive in 
nature and often driven by efficiency-related motives, makes it a strong candidate for 
spillover effects. “The resource curse” describes a set of negative experiences by oil-
rich countries. The effect of oil revenues and foreign companies getting involved in 
those revenues are first and foremost dependent on the quality of prior political 
institutions. “The Norwegian model” is regarded as the best example of resource 
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management credited due to its already mature democratic institutions and practices 
before finding oil. Recent studies show a positive trend for vertical linkages in 
resource-seeking FDI, partly due to pressure for local sourcing. 
 
3.2 Models for Industry – R&D Cooperation 
 
The industry-academia experiences in Brazil are colored by two main elements; that 
public entities have traditionally relied on university teams to perform research 
needed to solve problems and the formalized policy recently implemented to skew 
this tendency towards private participation and strengthen the national system of 
innovation (Suiz, 2000). This is an example that the industry-academia relation has 
been used as the basis of national innovation strategies that can be analyzed on two 
axes. In a “bottom-up” approach, the industry actors are actively looking for 
knowledge to solve a problem and meet with academic knowledge producers. There 
are situations in which the problem is defined by the academic part, or even a “third” 
player acting as a bridge builder between the academic player and the industry. A 
“top-down” approach, one investigate some outcomes of the institutionalized efforts 
recently developed, for instance that the state give financial incentives for UFRJ to 
conduct joint R&D projects with an industry partner.  
 
 
3.2.1   Cluster Theory 
 
 
“Paradoxically, the enduring competitive advantage in a global economy lie 
increasingly in local things – knowledge, relationships, and motivation that rivals 
cannot match.” 
       Michael E. Porter, 1998 
 
Holywood, Silicon Valley, Wall Street and Oslo Cancer Cluster have one major 
characteristic in common. Within different industries, they are all examples of 
agenda-setting clusters that have a competitive success tied to their respective 
location. Clusters, as defined by professor Michael Porter who re-introduced the term 
in the 90s, are “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized 
suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions in a particular field” (Porter, 
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1990). Clusters arise through complementarity or similarity of needs and thereby 
realize external economies of scale.  It has been argued that in an increasingly 
knowledge-based and globalized economy, the interdependence between ownership 
and location advantages grow stronger.  
 
Three basic features have emerged from studies of economics of geography, regional 
innovation systems, national innovation systems, knowledge transfers and social 
networks that seek to explain clusters. These centripetal forces that explain the 
location of some industries are a) knowledge spillovers, b) related and supportive 
industries and c) specialized labor force (Krugmann, 1998 and Marshall, 1920) and 
will be discussed below.  
 
a)  Alfred Marshall wrote in his Principles of Economics that “If one man starts a 
new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and 
thus it becomes the source of further new ideas” (Marshall, 1920). External 
knowledge spillovers occur when a positive exchange of ideas take place between 
employees from different firms, often stimulating technological improvements in a 
neighbor through one's own innovation.  From this, one can assume that as companies 
are geographically closer, knowledge transfer is convenient and innovation and 
growth is best facilitated. Knowledge-based theories argue that tacit and subtle 
knowledge will only be exchanged when being in the same local environment. This 
learning process is named ”dubbed buzz” and a distinction is made between, on the 
other hand, codified knowledge that are much less space-sensitive and may roam the 
globe through channels of communications called ”pipelines”, located outside the 
local milieu (Bathelt et al., 2004).  
 
b)  To examine the advantage of related and supportive industries one may 
distinguish between the horizontal and vertical part of the cluster. First, horizontal 
dimension refer to firms that produce similar goods and hence create competition. 
Clusters encompass resources and competences important for competition, such as 
specialized suppliers, service providers and linked industries and institutions, which 
together foster high level of productivity and innovation at the affiliate level. 
Accordingly, rivalry is one of the main pillars of cluster competitiveness. As Porter 
(1998) points out, competition is affected in three ways; by increasing the 
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productivity of companies in the area; by driving the direction and pace of innovation 
(product differentiation and variation), and hence growth; and by stimulation the 
formation of new ventures, which eventually strengthen the cluster itself.  
 
c)  The vertical dimension consists of those firms that are complementary and 
interlinked through a network of suppliers, services and customer relations (Bathelt et 
al., 2004). Once a cluster is established, suppliers have incentive to be near the 
demand for specialized services and supplies through which they can and gain 
economies of scale at low transaction costs. The value-creation relationships between 
a buyer and a seller, both upstream and downstream, must naturally be filled by 
employees. A vibrant cluster offers better access to specialized and experienced 
employees, enhancing the recruitment process. By signaling opportunity, young and 
aspiring actors are drawn to Holywood, talented investment bankers seek to London 
and so forth.  
 
Collaborative arrangements facilitate the process of “co-specialization” by the means 
of division of labor. It is assumed that non-core activities that are outsourced by one 
organization in a network become the specialization of another, hence the value-
creating activities become more efficient and effective (Wit and Myer, 2010:373).  
Such symbiotic groups of collaborating firms are often based on a high level of trust 
and perceived mutual interest. However, such dependence upon relationships comes 
at the risk of opportunistic9 behavior by the actors, abuse of trust and exploitation of 
dependence. In many ways, this paradox of competition and cooperation lie in the 
heart of cluster theory (Wiliamson, 1985).  
 
Vital in the cluster model is that firms are the premise makers –the R&D is driven by 
the needs of the specific industry -, and the R&D institutions are the premise takers. 
The “National System of Production” as introduced by Lundvall (1992), view market 
forces – demand and supply – as the starting point, rate and direction of innovation.  
This is not to disfavor or degrade the role of universities, institutions and academia 
integrated into the cluster, which is highly essential. The underlying model is however 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Defined as “Opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.” (Ron and Wit, 
2010:374) 
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analytically different from the next model, the Triple Helix, in which one assumes the 
R&D institutions as the driving force for innovation, and the firms as premise takers 
in this strategy. 
 
3.2.2  Triple Helix 
 
The Triple-Helix Model (TH) envision increased innovation as the outcome of 
interaction between the three parties; academia, industry and government.  The 
model’s origin is study of long-term university-institution relations (Etzkowitz, 2002), 
positive overlaps of communications (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1995), and how the 
knowledge infrastructure mechanisms intervene with market forces. Together, the 
three subdynamics are both bi-lateral as well as tri-lateral and may destabilize, hyper-
stabilize, meta-stabilize, or eventually globalize a relatively stable system 
(Leydesdorff, 2012). For example, the universities work closely together with the 
industry (double-helix), and the government support this synergy by providing 
innovative policies or incentives. 
 
 
Figure 6: A Triple Helix configuration with negative and positive overlap among the three sub-systems 
 
Unlike cluster theory, the TH model considers R&D institutions (universities) as the 
driver for innovation with its academic-based research and development activities. 
The industry is viewed as the provider of R&D based on the customer demand in its 
commercial activities, and the government as a policy maker. It is argued that the 
institutional dynamics are integrated historically into “functional subsystems” 
(Leydesdorff, 2006).  An important consideration is also that the system in hybrid in 
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the sense that the system remains in transition and transactions as the organizations 
are continuously developing individually and collectively. This also implies that 
geographical proximity is not a pre-requisite for the involved parties. This allows for 
interaction effects among domains (e.g., national systems) and institutions with 
specific functions (e.g., knowledge production). Hence, it represents a model used as 
an operational strategy for knowledge-based economies. 
 
The TH model may be applied for policy advice on network design. For instance, in 
university-industry relations the information flow may be enhanced or hindered 
dependent on the institutional context. The framework of patents will for instance 
have an effect on how the transfer of knowledge is enacted and the institutional 
arrangement may thus be evaluated in terms of how well the industry serve the 
transfer of new knowledge in exchange for university income.  
 
Another example, in which the TH model was applied for policy advice on network 
development, is the study on incubation on new industries in Brazil. In the late 80s, 
incubators started to appear in Brazil due to a new concept of Brazilian science and 
technology policies (STI). The society is shaped historically by relying on an active 
central planning and government programs. The new context brought about greater 
participation of the universities in the country's socio‐economic development, 
particularly by forging closer links between the academic world, industry and 
government. TH became a “movement” for generating incubators in the university 
context by “bottoming-up” with the local level – in collaboration with civil society 
(Almeida, 2005).  
 
 
3.3 Modes of Innovation 
 
 
FINEP, the Brazilian Funding Authority for Studies and Projects, apply the following 
definition of innovation, “the introduction of novelty or improvements in the 
productive or social environment that results in new products, processes or services”. 
A requirement is that the innovation must be made available in the market, applied in 
organizations or transferred to society.  
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A general distinction is made in the oil supply industry between innovation in 
application development and technical development (Asheim, 2012). The first is the 
ruling form of innovation and is often the spinoff of a real-life, specific challenge in 
relation to the development of large oil fields or similar projects. Such processes are 
characterized by small-step innovations that occur during the interaction between 
qualified engineers, competent suppliers and demanding costumers. Experience forms 
the basis of this incremental innovation process and literature refers to it as the 
“Doing-Using-Interaction” (DUI). Technical development builds on research or 
R&D-based methods of innovation, and is therefore given the name “Science-
Technology based Innovation” (STI).  STI revolves around cooperation between 
university and industry R&D projects to develop new technological platforms 
(applied technological research). 
 
 
Figure 7: Characteristics of the STI and DUI modes of innovation. (Source: Isaksen and Karlsen, 
2012) 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 
The methodology is structured according to Saunders’ metaphoric research onion, in 
which layers of research issues must be “peeled off” until the data collection method 
best fit is revealed.  
 
 
Figure 8: The Research Onion. (Source: Sanders et al., 2007). 
 
4.1  Research Philosophies and Approaches 
 
The choice of research philosophy set the standard as to how the world is viewed 
throughout the thesis. Crucial information on insights into Brazil, important dynamics 
of the subsea sector and complexity of cluster co-operation might be overlooked and 
neglected unless the aim is to uncover the interviewee’s personal view, impressions 
and subjective experience of the topics discussed. Logically, it is preferred in this 
thesis to apply a philosophy of interpretivism rather than a more ”scientist-like”, fact 
based approach.  
 
It is important to note that the research approach was inductive, as general 
knowledge and information-searching about the Brazilian market was the starting 
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point for the idea behind the thesis, long before a theoretical framework was explored. 
The role as a researcher is to understand the Brazilian market conditions, and the 
Norwegian subsea suppliers’ role in this context. Interpreting this phenomenon can be 
dome in numerous ways. One of the main challenges during the data collection 
process is to remain an objective understanding of the research subjects. In many 
ways, it is difficult not to become a part of the study, as interpretations and 
conclusions are inevitably affected by personal mindset and opinions. 
 
4.2  Research Design  
 
The research design represents the overall plan to answer the research question and 
consists of research choice, strategy and time horizon.  
This thesis employs a qualitative research framework, strategically chosen to gain a 
thorough understanding of the relevant representatives’ attitudes, perceptions and 
experiences on Norwegian participation in R&D of the Brazilian subsea sector. 
In line with the interpretivist perspective, a single case study will be pursued. Case 
study is not to be understood in a traditional sense, as I do not examine one specific 
organization/company, but rather several embedded units involving the state, the oil 
supply industry and clusters. In the final layer before approaching the core, it is 
important to keep in mind that what is being researched is a function of a particular 
set of circumstances and individuals at a specific time, i.e. current time. The in-debt 
interviews were conducted over a limited time horizon, and the most recent secondary 
data are emphasized. The problem is addressed cross-sectional and although historical 
details are utilized as a background for understanding, data are not collected over a 
long timespan. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to touch descriptive, exploratory, as well as explanatory 
aspects. Firstly, it is descriptive in the presentation of the areas of special potential for 
synergy between the Norwegian supply industry and the Brazilian market, 
characteristics of the petroleum market, R&D models and cluster development. 
Following this introduction, the exploratory journey takes off to ”seek new insight; to 
ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light” (Saunders et al., 2007:133) by 
analysing NCE Subsea in the Brazilian context. The explanatory research led to 
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pursuing new ideas, insights and inputs towards a more accurate and beneficial focus. 
Ultimately, explanatory research was sought to connect the relationship between the 
variables identified. To be more specific, strong interest was directed towards 
knowing if the NCE Subsea, its members and the operating model it represents, could 
function as a catalyst for R&D in the Brazilian subsea sector, and what challenges that 
acts obstructive. 
	  
4.3  Data Collection Methods 
 
Arriving at the core of the onion, the data collection consist of qualitative primary 
data from in-depth semi-structured interviews, supplied and complimented by 
secondary data. I returned to Rio de Janeiro in medio February 2014 and stayed for 
approximately two months to conduct qualitative research. It was an honor to be 
invited to stay in Innovation Norway’s Rio office during my stay where I was able to 
get in touch with key-respondents in my research. When surrounded daily by relevant 
respondents at Innovation House Rio, Innovation Norway’s incubator office, much 
valuable knowledge was attained simply through informal, day-to-day conversations. 
I scheduled in-depth interviews on a non-random basis in an attempt to cover different 
aspects of the population. The main objective while conducting interviews is to grasp 
the interviewee’s personal view, impressions and subjective experience of the topics 
discussed. Although the interviews were fairly limited in number and may thus not be 
generalized across the population, it was possible to uncover patterns in experiences 
and opinions from the respondents, which was crossed-validated with other sources. 
For instance, the Norwegian respondents were generally tuned in explaining the 
bottlenecks in the Brazilian subsea sector, which is also backed by statistics and 
economic reports. 
 
4.4  Collecting Primary Data by Conducting Interviews  
 
As mentioned before, primary data was collected through qualitative, semi-structured 
research interviews. An interview-guide was created before the first interview took 
place, and the main structure of topics has been followed throughout the process. 
However, adjustments have been made both depending on the interviewee’s 
	   36	  
background and knowledge, and in accordance to the acquired insight personally 
developed through the research. This flexibility led to rather interesting digressions 
during the conversations with the selected informants. Conducting the interviews it is 
important to keep in mind that knowledge and evidence are contextual, situational, 
and intellectual, and that it requires the researcher to take a distinctive approach to 
reveal the topic in question.  
 
11 interviewees were selected, representing nine different units, whom together have 
provided a rich and holistic set of data. On average, the interviews had a duration of 
one hour, and the majority were held in Rio de Janeiro, at the 
organizations/companies offices. Two of the objects were interviewed twice. The 
interviews were conducted in Norwegian or English, naturally decided depending on 
the mother tongue of the subject. All interviews except one were held face-to-face and 
audio-recorded whereas the meeting with Kjetil Solbrække, representing Sintef, took 
place trough Skype and could not be recorded. A summary of each interview is to be 
found in Appendix 1-9. All the summaries were emailed to the respective informants 
for approval and opportunity to make comments.   
 
The following were interviewed: 
 
Johanna Fiksdahl, Higher Executive Officer at the Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (OED). 
Johanna has been employed at the OED since fall 2013 working on issues of 
industrial and political relevance for the Norwegian oil supply and service industry 
and is highly involved in the project BN21. In her Master Thesis, she studied the 
Brazilian state’s local content policy in the petroleum sector and its implications for 
industrial development. Her background is hence professional, academically, and 
personal, drawing on experiences from her exchange semester at FGV in Sao Paulo. 
 
Therese Fuglerud and Anders Kapstad, respectively Administration manager 
and Country Manager in Panoro Energy do Brasil Ltda. 
Panoro Energy ASA is an independent O&G company with a balanced portfolio of 
production, development and exploration assets in Brazil and West Africa. Panoro 
Energy do Brasil Ltda. holds assets through long-term concessions grated by the 
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ANP, which are shared with other companies.  However, in 2013 the company 
conducted a restructuring process including a disinvestment from the Brasilian 
market.  An agreement to sell the Manati Field to the Brasilian operator GeoPark is 
waiting to be approved by ANP. The remaining assets in Brazil, collectively referred 
to as "BS3", are currently without buyers.  
 
Kjetil Solbrække, CEO in Instituto Sintef do Brasil 
Kjetil holds extensive knowledge about the petroleum sector and the Brazilian market 
with leading positions in OED (inter alia in supervising LC on supplies to the 
Norwegian industry), Norsk Hydro (involved in development of Pelegrino-field in 
Brasil), Statoil and Paroro Brasil. The strategic collaboration between Petrobras and 
Statoil paved the path for scientific and technological exchange between CENPES 
and Sintef. To coordinate these activities, MARINTEK (Sintef’s oil and gas division) 
opened offices in Brazil. Sintef Brasil is the first foreign research institution to be 
accredited by the Brazilian state, which potentially prove crucial for R&D 
development in the Brasilian oil sector and the Norway’s position in it.  
 
Gulbrand Wangen, Regional Director Brazil, India and Africa, INTSOK 
“INTSOK is a foundation aiming to strengthen the long-term basis for value creation 
and employment in the Norwegian oil- and gas sector through focused international 
activities, based on the overall corporate competitiveness.” INTSOK plays an 
important role in the research and technology cooperation in oil and gas entered 
between Norway and Brazil (BN21), where the purpose is to strengthen Norwegian 
industrial and research position in Brazil (Menon, 2013). Gulbrand provided me with 
more technically detailed understanding of the interdependency between Norwegian 
suppliers and the Brazilian oil extraction. Like he said “It is the industry we are doing 
all this for, after all”. 
 
Denise Medina and Leonardo Melo, Parque Technologica URFJ 
The technology park is situated on the Federal Univeristy (UFRJ) campus, on The 
University Island, an area of 350 thousand square meters employing about three 
thousand researchers. In the period 2003-2014, investments in the Park accounted for 
more than NOK 10 billion. Several multinational companies have installed research 
centers on site, among them Siemens AG, Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, FMC 
	   38	  
Technologies, Repsol YPF, Halliburton, Tenaris Confab and Usiminas. Nine SMEs 
are also present, whereas most are spin-offs from the COPPE/UFRJ Incubator located 
nearby. A more obvious example of cluster development can hardly be identified and 
Technology Park plays an important part in the Rio Subsea cluster.  
 
Jose Marcio Vasconcellos, Marine Engineer and Professor at the Offshore 
Engineering Program COPPE/UFRJ.  
R&D has traditionally been conducted by the academic institutions in Brazil, and 
UFRJ is one of the top rated and well respected universities. It has long ties with 
Petrobras, who strategically located its resarch center – CENPES – only steps away 
from the faculty. Jose is responsible for The Laboratory of Continuing Education 
(LabECO), created in 2001 to meet the demand for professional profiles and academic 
excellence able to manage projects, teaching and research activities applied to the oil 
and gas market. He has also been involved in numerous research projects conducted 
with private as well as public funding, on behalf of the industry as well as the 
government.  
 
Rune Andersen, Senior Advisor in Innovation Norway Brazil 
Rune has worked at strengthening the commercial relationship between Norway and 
Brazil for several years. He works in close cooperation with clusters and research 
institutions and is responsible for communicating the NCE cluster model to Brazilian 
counterparts. He also holds extensive knowledge about the Brazilian culture, 
institutions and language. 
 
Erik Hannisdal, CEO Inventure management 
From Erik’s 14 years of experience and accomplishments in Brazil, I would like to 
emphasize that he was one of the initiators to establish the IN house incubator office 
in Rio de Janeiro. As of 2009, he has been CEO of Inventure Management, a 
company he founded as a consequence of observing foreign companies struggle to 
penetrate the Brazilian Offshore and maritime sector. The business model proved 
successful and they now offer a complete operational platform to start up, manage and 
develop companies in Brazil.  
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Helge N. Austbø, Executive Vice President in DOF Brasil 
Helge has broad experience from the Brazilian oil sector. DOF Subsea provides 
specialised surveys, subsea construction and inspection repair and maintenance 
services and owns a large modern fleet of subsea construction, intervention and 
survey vessels. The group is headquartered in Bergen Norway and has been present in 
Brazil since 2001 through Norskan Offshore. Norskan Offshore is an operator of 
offshore supply, support and construction vessels in Brazil. 
 
4.5  Collecting and Analyzing Secondary Data 
 
Secondary data, i.e. data already collected for some other purpose, used in this thesis 
range from various reports, databases, printed material and company websites to 
books, blogs, journals and newspapers.  
The whole process has meant proactively seeking information, attending meetings and 
seminars to widen my knowledgebase. I was able to learn from interesting 
presentations at a whole-day seminar regarding “How to achieve local content in 
Brazil”, a presentation made by FINEP on how to finance R&D in Brazil, and an 
introduction to the anti-corruption law in Brazil with comparisons to the Norwegian 
anti-corruption law.  Secondary data was also beneficial to back up findings from 
interviews and discussions.  
 
Besides quantitative data on FDI, and sales revenues, the data collected were 
primarily qualitative. My results were derived from soft data, making it challenging to 
systemize according to conceptual framework rather than diagrams and statistics.  The 
core themes identified initially were theoretically supported to assume something 
about the effect and outcome of the relationship. This was further refined and 
explained by elements revealed in primary and secondary research. 
 
I am aware that the reports and evaluations prepared by consultants such as Ecön 
Poyry, Inventure Management, Menon and Bain & Company used in this thesis, may 
be biased in favor of the respective organizations the reports are prepared on behalf 
of. 
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4.6   Credibility of Research Findings 
 
The issue of credibility draws attention to two elements: reliability and validity. 
Reliability can be seen as the extent to which a consistent result can be produced at 
other times by other researchers (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009:250). First of all, this 
cross-section research is a result of a certain time and place, and is therefore 
unrealistic to fully replicate. One may only question my reliability as a researcher by 
unconsciously influencing the answers by imprecise formulation of questions, or in 
the categorization of interviewees’ replies. I was very aware of my tone of voice and 
expressions, especially when conducting interviews with native Brazilians. One must 
also be aware of participant bias driven by personal motives and loyalty toward the 
institution that he is representing.  I was thoroughly prepared before meeting with my 
informants, knowing about possible sensitive issues and was attentive towards 
reactions revealing thresholds of comfort. Generally speaking, Brazilians tend to be 
less confortable with direct questions, have less clear lines between opinions and 
facts, and might “overexpress” their feelings compared to an ordinary Norwegian. 
Although the respective respondents have approved my transcriptions of the 
interviews, arbitrary subjectivity and biases may be present. Validity is broadly 
referring to what extent the research method explores the phenomenon or variables 
we intend to explore (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009:251). In many ways I am studying 
a social phenomena, seeking an interpretation of the world through other peoples 
eyes. Such a social constructivist position can hardly be generalized, as it is merely 
subjective. However, it may be argued that applying the broad definition above 
principally enables qualitative research to give valid, scientific knowledge. An 
important issue worth discussing is gaining access to the appropriate sources, a 
primary motive for returning to Rio to conduct qualitative research. I will assert that 
my physical presence provided an armlenght access to desired sources.  
 
I recognize three possible shortcomings. Firstly, it would be preferred to interview a 
representative from the SEDEIS regarding their strategy of the subsea cluster, but it 
was not possible to carry out. The representatives from the Technology Park were 
fortunately able to provide me with updated information. Secondly, to get inputs from 
Petrobras on R&D collaboration with Norwegian subsea suppliers and thoughts on 
cluster participation would be interesting. I made a few attempts, but realized quickly 
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that it is challenging to reach the right person to speak to and made no further efforts. 
Lastly, I should advantageously have interviewed at least one of the Norwegian-based 
companies with manufacturing and research units in Rio de Janeiro. FMC 
Technology, Aker Solutions or OneSubsea would have been excellent informants, and 
I clearly acknowledge that their inputs most likely would affect my conclusion. 
Another seemingly natural object is a representative from NCE Subsea. The 
organization is this year undergoing a management shift, implying that my object of 
choice, the previous CEO Owe Hagesæther, who was responsible for monitoring and 
contact with the State of Rio, no longer is available. I have obtained information on a 
few issues through e-mail correspondence with Heidi Skålevik (Branding Manager in 
NCE Subsea), and Audun Otteren (Senior Facilitator Technology Development in 
NCE Subsea) and felt no further need to precede interviews.  
 
4.7  Alternative Methods and Expected Findings 
 
Alternative methodological choices may have been followed, and potentially reached 
different conclusions. To exemplify, the development of the Brazilian subsea sector 
could be analysed from a positivist approach. It could be reasonable to measure 
quantitatively the local value creation and employment by one or more members from 
NCE Subsea in the Brazilian subsea supply sector. In order to pursue this method, it 
would require access to detailed data on turnover and financial statements. This could 
potentially lead to a more concrete conclusion, however many of the effects are 
difficult to measure quantitatively, and irrelevant. For instance, if a Norwegian subsea 
company creates 100 manufacturing jobs in a subsidy in Rio, how can one determine 
what value this represents to the subsea industry in Brazil?  
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Chapter 5:  Analysis of the Findings 
 
Part A: FINANCIALLY 
 
Attracting Norwegian subsea investments 
 
Drawing on theory outlined in chapter 3.1, this part will discuss how encouraging 
Norwegian subsea suppliers to take part in the Brazilian market can be justified. 
Additionally, to determine whether FDI is an appropriate means to do it. Elements 
that collectively are referred to as “Custo Brasil”, the Brazilian Cost, might 
overshadow the ownership, localization and internalization advantages identified in 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm, implying that exports could be the favorable entrance. 
Studies indicate that FDI have greater spillover effects in the host country than export 
does, also in terms of R&D, which is why mode of entrance is highly relevant to 
determine in order to best answer the research question. 
 
5.A1   Size and Technology  
 
A complementary support system has been established in Rio de Janeiro to encourage 
and ease penetration into the Brazilian business environment. Innovation Norway and 
the incubator office house institutions such as INTSOK, the Ship Owners’ 
Association and the Norwegian-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce (NBCC), and share 
premises with the General Consulate. Separately and collectively, they offer 
institutional, logistical and advisory assistance to Norwegian SME and play a 
valuable role in fronting the Norwegian companies in Brazil.  While writing this 
thesis, I was able to observe how they fulfill their purpose with devotion. 
 
The focus on Brazil and Rio is with reason. Brazil is the best match in the world 
where Norwegian supplier can deliver what they are best at: offshore and subsea, 
Hannisdal state confidently. Pre-salt discoveries open up great opportunities for the 
oil industry, with its large demand for goods and services. Since 2001, we have 
witnessed the total purchases of goods and services from Norwegian suppliers to the 
offshore oil and gas recovery triple; sales of subsea-equipment and rigs in particular. 
This demand is driven by the high oil price as well as the breakthroughs in offshore 
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areas such as Brazil. Currently, Brazil is the second largest international market for oil 
service in terms of revenues10, world’s largest subsea market according to NCE 
Subsea and Inventure Management, and is associated with high expectations for 
further growth.  
 
As Solbrække proclaims, Brazil is currently one of the most exciting areas in the 
world to develop technology. For decades the Norwegian expertise from the 
continental shelf and internationally has been pioneers of technology development in 
offshore oil production. The Brazilian reality is deeper water and even tougher 
challenges and Petrobras is pushing the technological limits. Solbrække insist that to 
be part of this, and be able to bring Norwegian expertise into a new breakthrough 
area, will prove important for technology development going forward. Several of the 
interviewees claim that CENPES is in fact an explanation to the massive interest from 
multinationals to establish research centers. The representatives from the Technology 
Park experience that the cluster is growing around Rio because CENPES is located 
there, making it the hotspot for deep- and ultradeep water technology development. In 
this sense, Norwegian suppliers can meet demands, be part of technological 
innovation, as well as influence the technological development. INTSOK is, on their 
member’s behalf, presenting innovative technologies and solutions for the FPSO 
program. Wangen is hopeful that Petrobras will agree to buy the solutions adapted to 
their needs based on Norwegian technology that the suppliers apply elsewhere.  
 
5.A2   Attracting SMEs  
 
Every supplier is required to be certified in the Brazilian certification system before it 
can pursue any sale. According to ONIP (2011), about 40% of the equipment 
groups have not been considered as local suppliers. The figure below clearly backs 
that the estimated value of the market represented by national suppliers is very low.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Total revenues of NOK 27 millions in 2012, only following South Korea with NOK 30 millions. 
Source: Rystad, 2013. 
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Figure 9: Supply of Equipment and Systems in the Vendor list P-ZZ. (Source:ONIP 2011)  	  
One is therefore inclined to believe Hannisdahl when he claims that acquiring the 
right products, to the right quality at the right time is a challenge in Brazil. This 
experience cost Aker Solutions NOK 600 million in 2011. Delays and quality 
problems associated with its Brazilian suppliers of subsea equipment caused project 
costs to accelerate and delivery time for Petrobras could not be complied with 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 2011). Hannisdahl explain that as a consequence of the weak oil 
service supply chain in Brazil, more advanced planning and process management is 
required. Much equipment simply is not available in the market and it implies higher 
inventory costs. This, in addition to Brazil having one of the worlds highest import 
tolls, makes an efficient supply chain management crucial to survive.  
 
The need is obvious, however Kapstad indicate that the business size truly matters in 
this industry, and especially in Brazil where Petrobras holds such a dominant position. 
Panoro experienced additional challenges by being a small oil company both in terms 
of the “weight of their voice” and in maintaining a strong balance due to heavy capital 
demands. Norwegian suppliers do not necessarily need to be associated with 
Petrobras directly, it can also link up with one of the larger providers already 
contracted in Brazil. Paulo Guimarães point out in his book on collaboration between 
Brazil and Norway, that strong mutual dependencies exist in the production process in 
Norwegian business clusters, which is also supported by figures reported by Rystad 
displaying that many SME deliver to Norwegian companies only. The fact that many 
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Norwegian-based companies are present may therefore act as a stepping-stone into 
Brazil for the smaller companies.  
 
5.A3   The Brazilian Cost 
 
The Brazilian cost, as described in the special issue of The Economist (2013) refers to 
the very real extra operational costs associated with doing business in Brazil, making 
Brazilian goods and services more expensive compared to other countries. This cost is 
a result of several factors, such as legal restrictions, slow progress, poor 
infrastructure, excessive taxation, governmental inefficiency and extensive 
bureaucracy. These issues are clearly consistent with the key challenges for Brazilian 
companies as listed below and topics discussed with many of the interviewees.  
 
After the world oil exhibition took place in Rio de Janeiro in 2010, the expectations 
were euphoric. Statistics collected by Inventure Management (2013) report that 
during 2000-2009, 26 Norwegian companies were established in Brazil, whereas 33 
were established in the three following years. Innovation House Rio expanded its 
incubator office space in order to meet the intense interest. Hannisdal recall similar 
experiences with Inventure Management during this peak. The macroeconomic 
scenario is no longer as attractive as four years back when Brazil could demonstrate 
an astonishing 7.5% annual growth in GDP. Yet, Hannisdal underlines that although 
the interest has declined, the number of contracts offered now compared to four years 
ago has not been subject to substantial change. This may be seen as a reality-check by 
the Norwegian suppliers, rather than a genuine interest drop for participating in the 
Brazilian oil market  (Andersen, Fiksdahl and Hannisdal interviews). One might say 
that the bubble burst and what came into view is captured in Figure 10 below.  
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Figure 10: The Brazilian Cost. (ONIP 2011) 	  
Austbø explains the Brazilian tax model creates sincere obstacles. Not only because 
the general level of taxation burdensome, but also the complexity is unlike anywhere 
else.   
Local content requirements are generally seen as a constraint in the strategic business 
decisions of the internalizing firms, especially due to lack of qualified labor that in 
many ways can be said to be the root of the problem. The respondents from Panoro 
and Solbrække comment that there is no “brain-drain” in the local labor market, the 
problem is to catch them and offer a competitive salary, keeping in mind that both are 
mostly recruiting people with scientific and technical backgrounds. The scarcity of a 
national skilled workforce has naturally created a cycle increased labor costs, 
particularly in manufacturing. Lets follow Austbø’s chain of thought. At the time 
being, there is not enough capacity to construct, produce and install everything 
demanded in Brazil, and there are not enough people to do it. Naturally, resource 
pressures cause the labor cost for expertise to rise enormously, high salaries and 
inefficient recruitment combined. Hence, manufacturing costs increase, making the 
alternative cost of imported goods less unattractive. DOF’s providers are facing the 
same regime, and the same bottleneck; lack of competence. Due to a customs regime 
unfavorable of storage, inventory costs are high and time to delivery long. The result 
is a significant efficiency loss as the tax and tariffs are reflected in the price of goods.  
Consequently, producing in Brazil is more expensive than producing abroad. Austbø 
assumes that everything combined implies that building a shipyard in Norway is 
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approximately 30-40% lower than in Brazil.  
Even so, multinationals that are committed to the market on a long-term basis have 
obvious reasons to push their sub-suppliers to establish production locally as well. 
First of all, LC is calculated as a percentage of the finished product, and the more sub-
parts produced in Brazil, the higher the level of LC. Secondly, it may contribute to a 
leaner process reducing import regime obligations and delivery time. However, there 
is expressed a sincere discontent in regards to the quality of local production 
(Andersen, Hannisdal and Austbø). Several suppliers fear that equipment produced 
locally will be at the expense of quality, and that it appear as a major hinder for 
setting up local manufacturing. Austbø explains that is often beneficial to import 
despite the heavy import taxes and penalties for not meeting required LC. Production 
in Brazil is often equal to “greater risk for the buyers and greater risk for the 
suppliers”, and the risk generally increases parallel to technological intensity and 
engineering competence. From this, as exemplified by Austbø, one can argue that 
manufacturing of very technology intensive solutions such as ROVs lay further in the 
future than less high-tech systems applied in ROVs. 
 
The bright spot appear to be the effort to build competent local offshore workforce. 
The quality of training facilities designed for seafarers are becoming acceptable. 
Austbø explains that many of DOF Subsea’s suppliers have established training 
facilities in Rio de Janeiro on request from the contractors. Ricardo César Fernandes 
from Norwegian Ship Owners’ Association/Abran tells me that they are highly 
involved in developing the skills needed for their members –who often have 100% 
local crew– and is currently looking at possibilities to establish a simulator center for 
training of personnel (Ricardo C. Fernandes and Fiksdahl interview).  
 
5.A4   Financial Support of SMEs  
 
This being said, local presence is favorable in terms of funding. Building a local 
supply industry is prioritized on the political agenda and funding programs are 
important pieces of the overall picture. The MDCI is committed to cooperation 
though the BN21 program, in which several Norwegian-bound subsea suppliers are 
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already participating (whereas many of these are Norwegian-bound companies with 
Brazilian subsidiaries and thus perceived as Brazilian subsea suppliers). Fiksdahl and 
the BN21 are working to get the Brazilian supply chain on board as well. The 
Stakeholder task force of BN21 is currently submitting plans and proposing actions 
for collaborative efforts in projects within subsea technology.  
 
BNDES, the Brazilian state-owned development bank, is the key instrument for 
implementation of Federal Government’s industrial and infrastructure policies and the 
main provider for long-term financing in Brazil. BNDES has been actively involved 
in building local capacity in the supply chain as provider of necessary investments in 
the sector. The new strategic areas of focus introduced in the 21st century are 
innovation, sustainability and small businesses. More than 85% of the companies in 
the supply service chain are defined as SMEs, i.e. less than NOK 240 million (R$90 
million11) in gross annual operational revenue (BNDES, 2014). The program 
“BNDES Petroleum and Gas” is specifically devoted to strengthening the local SMEs 
through efforts to modernize and increase productivity of supply capacity, access to 
working capital and by supporting innovation and technological development in the 
oil and gas supply chain. Notice that the favorable loans are reserved for Brazilian 
equity controlled companies only. With respect to collateral, BNDES accepts the 
contract to provide a product or a service with the company (BNDES, 2014). It is also 
the major sponsor to other programs and agencies providing development 
finance/subsidized capital to SMEs, such as Promnip and FINEP, respectively. 
 
As previously mentioned, GIEK and Petrobras signed a framework agreement which 
guarantees for the financing of Norwegian deliveries to Petrobras for a maximum 
value of 1 billion USD (MoU, 2009). GIEK has expressed concern due to severe 
delays in the SETE shipbuilding program (briefly described in section 1.3 Five 
highlighted areas). Wangen comments that the current recommendation of the Board 
in GIEK is that it is too risky to provide credit guarantees. Petrobras has a history to 
pursue strategic plans too ambitious to meet schedule. As an example, he points out 
that some of the ships are ordered before the shipyard is even built. Such uncertainty 
expose the suppliers delivering to Petrobras to significant risk as well. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  1 Brazilian Real=2.68 Norwegian kroner as of May 18th 2014	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5.A5   Governance (Internalization) 
 
”You must have a paranoid manager to succeed in Brazil”  
Panoro Interview. 
 
It is difficult to remotely control operations in Brazil because one has to be “hands 
on” constantly. A foreign agent can hardly handle the complexity of the Brazilian 
business environment without extensive experience from doing just that. The majority 
of companies entering the market spend an alarming amount of money and energy 
(especially the two first years) to understand the Brazilian business environment 
(Hannisdal interview). As they tend to have a different commercial understanding 
than the “western”, sending an agent fronting the company’s values and culture is a 
cost one is recommended to budget (Panoro interview). Finding a country manager 
that fit both requirements might be difficult, which explains the demand for 
consultants in connection to market entrance. Inventure Management (IM) fulfills this 
role with a team consisting of specialists with cultural understanding and different 
academic/working backgrounds able to build a complete operational platform 
customized for the respective firm. Innovation Norway offers three packages to the 
companies interested in entrance support, depending on the level of assistance, 
whereas the most complete package is the most popular.  
 
5.A6   Regulatory Framework of LC 
 
It is clear that Governmental Agencies in Brazil – MDIC, ANP, BNDES, FINEP, and 
the State of Rio de Janeiro – have the same primary objective; building a competitive 
domestic supply industry and the read thread is to maximize LC on a competitive and 
sustainable basis. This may create obstacles as well as possibilities for Norwegian 
subsea suppliers. 
 
It is expressed from several sources that the timeframe and scope laid out by the 
government agencies might be too ambitious seen in comparison to the available 
capacity. The existent bottlenecks are undeniable. Domestic supply of equipment and 
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services are not competitive, and there is a lack of necessary technological capabilities 
(Olivieira, 2011). Profits are hurt as the firms are forced to acquire more expensive 
local equipment and often face delays in the delivery due to capacity constraints. In 
Andersen’s opinion, the suppliers delivering to the traditional Brazilian industries 
have been somewhat immature and lack decent incentives to make the investments 
necessary to be able to deliver to the oil industry. An industry is not transformed 
overnight and one must not forget that the Norwegian was built in 40 years – 
Petrobras ceased to be Brazil's legal monopolist only in 1997 (Fiksdahl interview). 
Petrobras’ president Graca Foster announced in Mach 2014 that “increasing 
the production is higher in the agenda than local content policies”. She added that “it 
is not possible to accomplish everything locally, and Petrobras cannot prioritize 
contracts that pose a threat to the oil production curve.” (Innovation House Rio 
newsletter, 19th march 2014).  
 
All of those who were interviewed confirm that LC is principally a solution to 
support, but it causes trouble in Brazil due to the low level of general education, 
experience and infrastructure. The regulations have caused headaches for many 
foreign companies and substantial adaptations to achieve what is required. Purely 
operational, it represents an enormous paper mill delay in collecting certificates from 
all levels and links in the value chain before handed over to the ANP for final 
evaluation (Hannisdal interview). Hannisdal and Panoro are relieved to observe a few 
signals of moderations, as a result of expressed discontent by the industry and 
Petrobras. To exemplify, the LC may be bypassed (i.e. product may be imported) if 
proven that such technology is not available in Brazil. Note that price, quality or time 
to delivery is not taking into consideration. It is argued that the protectionistic 
environment is giving the industry “crutches” as local suppliers and subcontractors 
will be favored despite their inability to compete with international providers. In any 
case, many Norwegian suppliers are providing highly specialized products, and no 
local competitors exist, and are therefore not affected by the policies. According to 
Dunning’s work, these specific assets carry ownership advantages being technology 
not available in the market, and export may be preferred over FDI. Regardless, 
Hannisdal finds it surprising that many companies do not invest more effort in 
understanding these regulations in depth, and rather attack the issue by asking “How 
can I maximize LC without increasing the price on my product?”. 
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The rapid growth of FDI inflow simultaneously as a growing number of Brazilian 
manufacturing subsidiaries and research centers have been established may be proof 
that many realize they have no choice if they want to deliver. However, the cost 
associated with LC may be too large for SME to bear. Thus, it may prevent new 
players and technologies from penetration due to investments needed prior to 
deliveries. Ultimately, Hannisdal does not think that LC policies has affected the 
quality of the suppliers in Brazil due to the fact that the focus is mainly on the 
material content in the product, and not giving equivalent credit for building 
engineering capabilities.  
 
5.A6.1  The New Regulatory Paradigm 
 
 
Although ANP have made changes in some areas to make demands and expectations 
more realistic, others areas are the opposite. The “Pre-Salt law” introduced a stricter 
regulatory system of E&P in 201012. As summarized by Deloitte, the new framework 
lay down guidelines on Production-Sharing Contracts (PSCs) to be applied to the 
unlicensed pre-salt area and other areas deemed strategic by the Federal Government. 
In practice, it implies that Petrobras will serve as the sole operator with mandatory 
participation interest of minimum 30% in each winning consortium.  
Please note that the type of contractual form does not directly impact the oil service 
providers as they are usually sub-contracted under other agreements dependent on the 
delivery. It is however relevant to mention as it understates the fundamental 
protectionist attitude tightened after the pre-salt discoveries. The risks and rewards 
related to E&P activity is highly skewed in favor of the state in PSCs. The Oil 
Company must bear investment costs required to explore, develop and produce the 
pre-salt fields for which the associated risks is compensated through cost oil (only in 
the scenario of successful production).  
Fiksdahl believes that the uncertainty created in connection to this framework may 
have caused Brazil to miss a window of opportunity that Pre-Salt helped create. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Law no. 12.304/2010 Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A. and Law no. 12.351/2010 Production-Sharing 
Agreement 
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licensing rounds were put on hold for five years until the long-anticipated auction date 
of Libra, the “crown-jewel” of pre-salt, was a reality October 2013. It is located on 
the largest reserves ever discovered in Brazil, estimated to contain 8-12 billion barrels 
of oil and the investments needed exceed USD 50 billion over 35 years.  The situation 
was intense, but for a whole other set of reasons than hoped. Due to the new 
regulatory framework, the predicted commotion was absent. The only bidding, and 
hence winning consortium consist of Petrobras (40%), Dutch Shell (20%), French 
Total (20%), and Chinese CNOOC and CNPC (10% each). Despite the fact that the 
government hoped for 40 bidders, the state and Petrobras (and its shareholders13), was 
tremendously relieved. Under the PSC, the investors fared that the worlds most 
indebted National Oil Company could be burdened by a majority stake (and finances) 
for the Libra field. Specialists claim that the outcome of the auction only postponed 
the necessary changes to the regulatory framework before the next bidding scheduled 
for the beginning of 2015 (Rodrigues, Napolitano and Paduan, 2013). It appears to 
Fiksdahl that the unrest has settled somewhat, but the new rules are still being tested, 
and changed, and confidence between Petrobras and its investors is still unstable.  
 
5.A7  Conclusion Financial Aspect 
 
Governmental, political and industrial actions and intentions signal that Norwegian 
industry is seeking a strategic positioning in the Brazilian market, in competition with 
foreign companies, with the aim of exploiting potential activities in the pre-salt area.  
Likewise is Brazilian state apparatus and local affiliates welcoming Norwegian 
suppliers to participate and creating incentives to conduct research, realizing that the 
foreign technology and experience is needed to develop the supplier industry in Brazil 
(ref. 1-2% of value is only national companies, figure 9).  
 
The local content policies aim to translate the massive investment programs into 
generation of jobs and income for the country, much similar to the Norwegian motive 
decades ago. It is fair to insinuate a disparity between the level of ambition and 
delivery capacity, which might give the local industry artificial nutrition rather than 
create a competitive oil service industry. It seems that neither is the case to the extent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13Petrobras shares rose 5% on the day of the auction, and fell 1.7% the following day. 
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it should. The local industry is far from competitive enough to even go for a stroll 
with their cushioned crutches and ultimately imported quality products triumphs the 
risk of producing technology locally. The outspoken desire to meet LC is not always 
reflected in what could be built with existing and projected demand, so as to enhance 
local capability and allow capturing more value in the future. The policies are mainly 
focused on the material content in the products as opposed to engineering, and 
therefore had insignificant affect on the quality of the subsea supply chain. The bright 
spot appear to be training of Brazilian seafarers to operate Norwegian-controlled 
offshore vessels. The effects towards closing the gap of local competence will 
probably be enhanced as the Ship Owners’ Association seek to establish a Norwegian 
Simulator Centre, given that the result of the current Feasibility Study is positive.  	  
There is a general consensus that the Brazilian environment – despite all its 
shortcomings – represents opportunities for Norwegian subsea suppliers that simply 
cannot be overlooked. In Dunning’s words, ownership and localization advantages are 
present for Norwegian subsea suppliers. The means of penetration and continuing 
management must be considered in depth in terms of internationalization advantages. 
Regardless, the key is to lower the cost while doing it and win orders by being smarter 
in other parts of the products ”price”. Doing business in Brazil is challenging in terms 
of regulatory framework as well as cultural aspects, and ultimately the SMEs must 
choose if local presence carry lower risk to exporting based on the same price-quality-
time ratio that their contractor apply. Nevertheless, it is suggested to deal with the 
market as closely as possible, and one must have a representative that corresponds 
with the company’s intensions and is familiar with the Brazilian patterns of business 
behavior. Drawing on services offered by agents like Inventure Management may still 
decrease total risk, even after taking the risk of loosing ownership advantage into 
consideration. A different commercial understanding combined with a tendency to 
juggle the facts - an opinion is often outspoken by Brazilians as statistics are for 
Norwegian (Inventure Management, 2013) - implies that one might get an unpleasant 
surprise if crosschecks of information are not verified and closely followed.  
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PART B: TECHNOLOGICALLY 	  
 
Co-operation across and within universities, research centers (industry), and 
research institutions 
 
Argumentation in this part will be made under two assumptions, namely that E&P in 
the pre-salt area is subject to innovation, and that mobilizing cooperation between and 
across different players is a powerful model.  Drawing on theory outlined in chapter 
3.2 regarding models for industry-R&D cooperation, this part will discuss recent 
trends in the Brazilian Innovation System, with special attention on holistic “top-
down” incentives institutionalized to boost private participation in R&D and promote 
joint projects between academia and industry. Interestingly, in the industry-academia 
relation, well-defined problems are to a larger extent than traditionally, identified by 
the firm who seek assistance for knowledge production in the university. In this 
context, Sintef may represent a crucial “third” player for enhanced cooperation. 
 
5.B1  The Norwegian Model of R&D  
 
The Norwegian Government proclaimed sovereignty of the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf in the early 60s, while at the same time opening up for licensing that gave oil 
companies or consortiums, exclusive rights to carry out exploration, development and 
production in the awarded block (Lerøen, 2006:167). Consequently, this initial phase 
were dominated by foreign companies, and Statoil remained the “underdog” for a 
while after its creation in 1972. To attain technology and experience, Statoil turned to 
international companies in the oil sector as well as other leading industrial actors such 
as the American airplane producer Boeing for assistance. The Norwegian government 
used political mechanisms to promote industry collaboration across borders and 
viewed Statoil as an instrument in this strategy (Tuber and Istad, 2012).  
 
The year 1979 marks an important milestone as Statoil’s very first research leader, 
Knut Åm, was appointed. The R&D was organized not only to meet the future needs 
in terms of operational tasks, but also to create an exceptional level of insight- and 
knowledge with an effect on safety and socio economic wellbeing. The basic research 
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program VISTA14 was funded to promote the cooperation between Statoil and 
academia by ensuring, amongst other; 
 
• multidisciplinary contact between Statoil and Norwegian research milieus 
• stimulate and promote Norwegian scientists and their communities within the 
prioritized areas significant for the petroleum industry (Lerøen, 2006:169). 
 
This also laid the foundation for the first agreement between Statoil and the 
University of Oslo signed in 1985. Extremely complex solutions are found within and 
through the interference of academic disciplines such as geology, geophysics, math, 
physics, chemistry and biology (Johnsen, 2008:221-224).  It is claimed that the most 
advanced development within national knowledge and competence building are when 
resources are mobilized like in the VISTA-projects. The project have resulted in a 
series of PhDs, Post Doc projects, publications in international journals and most 
importantly; the results have been applied and utilized in many of Statoil’s petroleum 
projects (VISTA, 2010). 
 
Sintef was originally established in 1950 by the Norwegian Institute of Technology 
(NTH, today incorporated into NTNU), as NTNUs instrument for performing 
contracted research (Sintef, 2014). It illustrates clearly how the institute sector was 
consciously assigned the responsibility to conduct applied research and soon became 
a natural center of knowledge generation within the nascent oil and gas industry. 
Investments in research to the Higher Education sector and the Institute sector have 
roughly accounted for ¼ each, and the private sector accounting for the remaining 
investments in R&D (Norges Forskningsråd, 2013:18). 
 
Parallel to the growth of Statoil was the Norwegian supply-industry. Johnar Olsen, 
representing Scana Industries, one of the companies facilitated by Innovation House 
Rio, highlights the valuable feature that enabled Statoil to hold shares in selected 
suppliers to ease commercialization of the patents. The ability for the industry to 
commercialize these technologies, especially small companies, was an important 
feature that enabled by the Norwegian system of suppliers to evolve (Olsen, 2006).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Det Norske Vitenskaps-Akademi	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The “Innovation law” in Brazil allows for a similar injection by the federal 
government in the stock capital of companies aiming at developing scientific 
projects15.  
 
Summarized, Statoil did far more than building a leading oil company because the 
alliances built towards the research and supply industry is what truly created the 
Norwegian model of R&D.  
 
 
5.B2 Characteristics of Brazilian Model of R&D 
 
Under Petrobras’ monopoly combined with the import substitution policies of the 
Brazilian governments in the 80s, generous incentives were provided to the 
development of domestic suppliers of equipment. Unlike Statoil, the main rational for 
interacting with other organizations was to acquire equipment and services according 
to the operational needs, and flows of knowledge was a secondary by-product of the 
transfer (Dantas and Bell, 2009). Eventually, the 80s were colored by massive macro-
economic instability that led to innovative inertia for the domestic suppliers. 
Combined with the repeal of the monopoly in 1997, it is no surprise that international 
competitors outplayed the bundle of unsupported domestic suppliers. The local 
content policies were introduced as an instrument to counteract the inevitable 
decrease of domestic content in Petrobras’ projects. Petrobras engaged in more 
actively in learning networks to internalize know-how important to pursue more R&D 
activities independently in the future. Collaborative agreements shifted from being 
primarily suppliers to include universities, research institutes, and other oil 
companies. The company also joined multiple arrangements for knowledge 
production, for example one with Smedvig (former Seadrill) to obtain knowledge on 
subsea drilling (Dantas and Bell, 2009). In the beginning of the 21st century, it is 
claimed that Petrobras was “increasingly involved in internally-driven asymmetric 
arrangements in which Petrobras itself was the leading performer of R&D activities 
within a given network arrangement, for instance, when Petrobras led joint industry 
projects and invited others to join in.” The reality is perceived differently from a 
Norwegian perspective. Austbø claims that the knowledge transfer is mainly from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Law no. 10.973/04 Technical Innovation Act 
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international companies to Brazil, and that very little of their experiences with 
Petrobras can be utilized in other markets. Plus, Sintef’s unique competitive 
advantage in the Brazilian market is simply its knowledge about conducting an 
innovative research process. 
 
5.B3 The STI and Industrial Policy in Brazil 
 
International comparisons conducted by actors such as the OECD reveal weak 
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) performance in Brazil, in particular by 
SMEs (OECD, 2012). Figure 12 below display a section of comparative statistics on 
competence and capacity to innovate and indicate that cheering would be premature  
(keeping in mind that these are total investments rather than sector-based).  The weak 
data is explained by difficult framework conditions backed by a low entrepreneur 
index, combined with a demanding social context colored by a general low level of 
education and income inequality.  The red dots represent Brazil, the black Norway, 
and the blue rectangles are the middle range of the OECD values (OECD, 2012).  
Figure 11: Comparative performance of national STI systems. (Source: OECD, 2012). 
 
The Greater Brazil Plan (Brasil Maior) intends to encourage innovation and 
incorporating value in the production sector through incentives worth USD 16 billion 
during 2011-2014 (Mercosul, 2011). Moreover, the National strategy for Science, 
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Technology and Innovation (ENCTI) was designed to: i) close the technological gap 
with developed economies; ii) support Brazil’s leadership in the nature-related 
knowledge economy; iii) strengthening the internationalization of the national 
research system; iv) foster the development of a green economy; and v) address social 
and regional inequalities (inclusiveness) (Andersen interview and OECD, 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 12: STI and Industrial Policies in Brazil. (Source: Luiz Antonio Elias, 2013)  	  
Another program worth mentioning is Inova Petro, a joint initiative by FINEP (a 
funding authority for science and technology under the Ministry of Science of 
technology) and BNDES, with technical support from Petrobras. The program is 
worth BRL 5 billion (second tender additional BRL 3 billion) and subsea suppliers 
(submarine installations) are one out of three company categories that may 
participate. Its goal, as presented by Relgada in FINEP, is to promote projects that 
involve R&D, engineering, technology absorption, production and marketing of 
products, processes and/or innovative services aimed at developing Brazilian 
suppliers for the supply chain of petroleum and gas industry (FINEP, 2014). Brazilian 
subsidiaries of Norwegian companies may apply if proven a gross turnover of 
minimum BRL 16 million, or net equity equal to BRL 4 previous fiscal year.  Both 
Helle Moen, CEO of Innovation Norway Rio and Relgada comment that Norwegian 
subsidiaries are very attractive receivers. It is expected that this program will 
contribute to policies to increase local content and for the competitiveness and 
sustainability of the national supply chain. 
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Helle Moen, CEO of Innovation Norway in Rio wrote in an email received by the 
author on May 26th 2014, that a co-funding agreement for research projects is 
currently being established. Funding is on the agenda in BN21, and FINEP, 
Innovation Norway and The Norwegian Research Council are currently setting the 
terms of the agreement.  
 
5.B3.1  Private Sector Investment in R&D 
 
Direct government funding for domestic R&D has played a significant role in 
Brazilian technology development (Sutz, 2000). The vast majority of both basic and 
applied research has been carried out in public universities and research centers, often 
at the request of a public entity. Hannisdahl have noticed that there exists ingrown 
notions of what R&D can contribute to, but that the Brazilian industry is slowly 
realizing that one can actually profit from investing money in research. It seems as if 
the tables might be turning. Vasconcellos explain that before they had to offer ideas 
[research projects] to the companies, but now the companies contact UFRJ because 
they have observed that the university can bring results important for them.  
 
According to The Norwegian Research Council (2013), a lower threshold for research 
in enterprises will theoretically lead to higher research capacity, greater technology 
diffusion and increased ability to adopt and disseminate technology. As presented by 
Mr. Elias at the R&D, Innovation and Industrialization seminar in Rio de Janeiro, 
policies are redesigned to increase expenditures by the private Brazilian industry, 
which currently is significantly lower as a ratio to GDP compared to other countries 
such as the USA, China, Germany, Korea and Norway – to name a few (Elias, 2013). 
Media and Melo are pleased to see that many of the newcomers in the Technology 
Park are bringing business models and mentalities that are accustomed to R&D 
budgeting, and agrees that it might affect the attitude ruling in the market. 
Additionally, as production in the blocks increase, the 1% rule might prove as an 
efficient tool in surging foreign investments. The Brazilian concessions are 
increasingly operated by international companies, and obligations are expected to 
generate a cumulative total of USD 9,5 billion in R&D spending by 2020, as 
graphically presented below. The representatives from the Technology Park at URFJ 
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reflect that this rule might play a notably role for the companies to establish research 
facilities in Rio and elsewhere. 
 
 
Figure 13: Forecast of Investment Obligation in R&D through 2022. (Source: Innovation House Rio, 
2013) 	  
Subsea suppliers are generally not bound by this law, but will most likely notice the 
activitygrowth in number of partners and projects. As an example of how great 
spillover effects related to R&D could be, E&P Magazine estimated that for every one 
CENPES researcher –there are 1.800 of them– 15 external researchers are working in 
one of their partner institutions (universities and providers of goods and services).  
 
Previously, grants were given directly to the URFJ as outlined in section 3.2 and 
confirmed by Vasconcellos. Following the enactment of the Innovation Law in 2012, 
UFRJ must cooperate with a company in order for FINEP to evaluate funding for 
projects. These “competitive grants” permits direct funding of business and the annual 
budget amounts to approximately USD 348 million (OECD, 2012). As discussed after 
an informative presentation about FINEP held by Relgada, there exist a unique 
possibility to invest resources in R&D in Brazil, as there is currently more funding 
available than projects. As previously discussed, large Norwegian subsea suppliers 
such as Aker Solutions are investing significant amounts in R&D in Brazil, which is 
likely to challenge both the existing technology as well as attitudes towards private 
sector contribution to R&D. Hannisdal comment that now is the time for Global 
companies to evaluate the possibilities of moving its international R&D operations to 
Brazil as well. He adds that for the SME it might be more relevant to develop existing 
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products to make it adaptable to the Brazilian market conditions, i.e. DUI mode of 
innovation. In this case, it might be useful that another tool introduced by the 
Innovation Law is the sharing of laboratories among very small and small companies, 
which is also available at Ilha do Fundão (Vasconcellos interview).  
 
5.B3.2  Applied Science and Sintef Brasil 	  
 
In applied science, research is primarily directed towards a specific practical solution 
and applications. It differs from basic research where one seeks new knowledge by 
analyzing the underlying foundation of a phenomenon and observable facts, whereas 
applied research will often be the offspring of problems with an original character.  
 
One of the major differences between the Brazilian and the Norwegian R&D 
landscape is size of the institute sector, meaning entities primarily devoted to research 
that are not part of neither higher education sector nor the industrial (Solbrække 
interview). It produces science (which separates them from consultants) and serves 
the business and public administration on contracted assignments (which 
distinguishes them from universities and colleges). Thus, fulfill a distinctive role in 
the research dynamics due to its relevance to applications in business, a gap causing 
the sector to bleed in the Brazilian O&G sector. Sintef may narrow this gap, as the 
only research institution in Brazil that can conduct applied research projects for the oil 
industry from problem to solution. Solbrække experience high demands for their 
services and seek to expand the current workforce from 20 to 50-100 researchers in a 
3-5 year period. Last year, Sintef was given public accreditation by ANP, which 
entitles access to apply for funding from the sizeable "Special Participation Fund" 
(SPF). CENPES remains their main partner, however contracts are won with 
multinationals as well. Panoro, bound by the “1%-rule” as a concessionaire, found 
Sintef as a useful and excellent partner to manage the required research spending. 
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5.B4   Collaborative efforts for Pre-Salt E&P 
  
Deep below sea level, trapped underneath rock, 
sand and a geological layer of salt, lie the enormous 
riches of the Pre-salt oil. This could, in many ways, 
be the opening of the Brazilian oilfairytale. The pre-
salt oil discoveries in a period of higher oil prices 
mark as a transformation in the Brazilian oil sector 
and may, according to the U.S. Energy Information, 
have a vast impact on the world oil markets. 
 
 
However, the salt layer pose severe technical issues 
to penetrate, and massive investments in E&P and 
infrastructure are preconditioned to support 
innovations over the next decades. In order to 
achieve the oil production targets, Petrobras budget 
to invest USD 153.9 billion in E&P in Brazil of 
which 60% are earmarked pre-salt and 40% post-
salt (Petrobras, 2014). Petrobras represents an 
exception to the general industry behavior with its 
generous budgets fueling CENPES.  
It is however important to note the reality the highly 
indebted Petrobras face in PSCs as discussed in Part 
A, and what constraint this potentially could imply in resources originally intended 
for R&D. Nevertheless, the industry development cannot depend on Petrobras to pull 
the train for them; not only is the job far too capital intensive, but it will only foster 
Petrobras’ dominance as research conducted is exclusively based on inter-firm value 
creation (Solbrække and Vasconcellos interview).  
 
Vasconcellos explains that the UFRJ receive several projects due to capacity 
constraints at CENPES. However, interaction between the firms in the technology 
park is very limited. Medina and Melo explain very little is arranged to engage the 
Figure 14: Pre-Salt Layers.(Source: The 
Economist, 2011) 
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industry participants to interact, and Andersen claim the multinationalcompanies 
independently large enough. Many of the subsea suppliers are currently experiencing 
such high demands for existing goods and services that R&D is not prioritized 
(Holmedal, 2013). The situation is somewhat disfavoring disruptive innovations, as 
capacity is sustainable without. Warning signal or not, it might be fair to agree to 
Wangen’s point that the industry and research development is not necessarily parallel 
and gaps between the operations might appear.  
 
It is therefore vital to anchor research programs on government level, which is why 
Fiksdahl is convinced that BN21 carry much weight. Brazil is a country in which the 
industry normally does not engage in technology cooperation without help from the 
authorities, and perhaps political leadership of the TTAs will prove momentum. In 
fact, it Petrobras said that they would continue their discussions with the group or the 
ongoing partnership with Statoil unless the contract was signed. One recognized a 
mutual potential that would benefit both parties if efforts were aligned to face 
challenges with regard to development of offshore oil and gas technology, and 
particularly within subsea technology. It is proposed, among others, to establish a 
“subsea factory”, where modules are placed down to the seabed. Fiksdahl tells that the 
follow-up BN21 meeting which took place in March give reason to believe that 
underwater technology will be a strategic TTA for cooperation, subject to changes in 
further discussions. The industry is led by Statoil and Petrobras (that would not 
continue cooperation unless agreement was signed) together with Det Norske Veritas-
GL, Aker Solutions, FMC Kongsberg Subsea, and Norwegian Ship owners’ 
Association. The academia and research institutions are broadly represented by 
universities such as Sintef, CNPq, University of Stavanger (IRIS), NTNU, UiO, UiB. 
The governmental body include OED, Innovation Norway and the research council 
from the Norwegian side, and the MCTI, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, FINEP 
and CNPq from the brazilian side, as well as embassies from both sides.  
 
 
5.B5 Conclusion technological opportunities 
 
To illustrate the cooperation across and within universities, research centers, and 
research institutions in both countries, the author designed two models based on 
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industry-academia-government relations found in this study. This is not to claim that 
the Norwegian Model of R&D is to be perceived as “perfect”, however its relatively 
balanced interaction is a good starting point to untangle how the Brazilian model 
disperses. 
 
 
 
 
The programs in the Brazilian STI strategy propose groundbreaking shifts in legal 
framework supporting private business participation in research projects. It also 
creates various financial motives, many with special attention to SMEs. With 
reference to Andersen, there is reason to believe that Brazil has finally found a 
reasonable and integrated innovation system across states and state level inspired by 
the Triple Helix model. However, potential improvements in industry-research 
cooperation have witness that the STI in the Brazilian subsea supply chain is still 
immature, mainly based on the historical neglect of technology innovation. The 
industry need time to “learn” to engage in technology cooperation, and BN21 can 
potentially gain momentum as forces are gathered from government, universities, 
research institutions and industry to solve technological challenges related to subsea 
solutions, partly because it is administered by the state.  
 
Figure 16: Triple Helix in Rio Figure 15: Triple Helix in NCE Subsea 
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The surge of entry by multinationals are essential contributions to high-technology 
solutions for bottlenecks in the Brazilian oil service chain, and may definitely give 
reason for small SMEs to follow. The enormous Technology Park represents a very 
optimistic facilitator for advanced co-operation between industry and university, 
which is why its logo is overlapping the two circles in the above figure.  
Although still a “drop in the ocean”, it seems as tough Sintef has found a reasonable 
niche in the Brazilian market connecting science to application, and hereby 
strengthening the “bottom-up” mechanisms. Solbrække is confident that taking part in 
R&D processes locally will also strengthen Sintef as a whole by gaining expertise and 
access to projects otherwise unlikely.   
 
Funds though competitive calls that provide better repayment conditions if projects 
also involve collaboration with universities, and funds earmarked solemnly for joint 
projects, links academia to the industry – indirectly away from the government. One 
is therefore likely to see the upper circle shifting toward the center.  
 
It is difficult to identify how LC requirements impact the cooperation, and findings 
indicate that the effects pull in separate directions; the policies encourage cooperation 
while causing constraints that hinders it. There is reason to believe that the scheme 
makes cooperation within the industry more dependent on each other as they are faced 
with the same challenges. A practical example is the training centers provided by the 
sub-contractors of DOF Subsea, so that DOF Subsea’s employees are sufficiently 
trained to operate in Brazil. At the same time, the fact that one of the major challenges 
is related to capacity might reduce R&D to second order of importance. 
 
 
 
PART C: INSTITUTIONALLY 
 
Research and innovation structure in research and innovation 
 
 
This part seek to analyze if the successful experiences of NCE Subsea can be credited 
characteristics of how research is structured, and weather these features can contribute 
to R&D in Rio Subsea Cluster. In chapter 3.2 and 3.3, a distinction is made between 
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the cluster model and the TH by settling the driving force behind innovation. Drawing 
on traditional characteristics of research development in Brazil and Norway 
respectively, it is perhaps no surprise that the Norwegian model is best described as a 
cluster model, whereas Brazil falls in the other category. What appears true is that the 
implications by applying NCE Subsea model in Rio Subsea Cluster is perhaps more 
related to cultural aspects rather than a premature national system of innovation.  
 
5.C1 Evaluation of NCE Subsea 
 
Collaboration and links between the members of the cluster was limited before the 
establishment in 2006, and has grown considerably since. Collectively, the members 
of the cluster have had a higher growth in both employment and value creation than 
comparable business sectors, in Norway as well as abroad (Econ Pöyry, 2009). A 
report prepared by Econ Pöyry concludes that NCE Subsea in a short time attained 
functional structure and has proven to be efficient and effective, and that the clusters’ 
identity and the members’ relations is largely a result of NCE Subsea. The program 
will terminate in 2016, and is currently qualifying for a new program, Global Centres 
of Expertise (GCE).   
 
The R&D and technology development takes place on several levels, as described by 
Audun Otteren in NCE Subsea in an email received on May 25th 2014. These levels 
are a) further development of its own technology in each company or business 
cooperation (with or without public R & D support), b) through collaborations with 
research institutions (initiated by companies or research institutes) and c) longer-term 
R & D projects initiated by research institutions funded by public research funding 
and/or industry/companies.  
 
The cluster model still seems to be the current model for co-operation between SMEs 
and R&D-Institutions within the cluster. This is justified by cooperation that exists to 
a large extent on the industry’s premises, which is also confirmed by Otteren, yet with 
significant research contributions from institutes and part funding from the public 
institutions such as Innovation Norway and the Research Council. With reference to 
Figure 7, Characteristics of the STI and DUI modes of innovation, it seems relatively 
evident that the SMEs act as premise makers for Industry-R&D cooperation.  
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5.C2 NCE Subsea as a Role Model in Rio Subsea Cluster 
 
Medina and Melo are proud to tell that the Rio Subsea cluster was officially launched 
in medio March 2014 with ten official partners onboard. The University Island would 
be an obvious location for the cluster administration, however the island is restricted 
to R&D and manufacturing is forbidden. The cluster will therefore be a virtual 
structure rather than a physical one, incorporating the companies relevant to the 
subsea sector in the Rio area, still within such proximity that mobility and 
communication between companies in the group will not be hurt. The Rio Subsea 
Cluster are aiming to attract the whole supply chain of both SMEs and the larger 
service and supply companies, and are experience lots of interest from the industry.  
 
The Technology Park is highly involved in the cluster development and highlight that 
Norway is used as a cluster model. The representatives from the Technology Park 
express sincere interest to learn about the Norwegian experience in organizing 
clusters, and government participation in this picture. Medina and Melo 
 
Comments made by Fiksdahl, Wangen and Vasconcellos indicate skepticism to the 
practical implications. The Norwegian system of cluster development is not 
transferable to the Brazilian context as the countries are in completely different stages 
of development. Vasconcellos believe that Rio could copy the Norwegian system of 
cluster development, but the obstacle is a general attitude by the people that do not 
support cluster culture, which only can be changed by raising the level of elementary 
education. Both Wangen and Andersen claim that Brazil is more advanced (at least 
comparative) to Norway in terms of cluster competence. Wangen was impressed to 
observe, in a recent workshop arranged by INTSOK with visits to shipyards in Rio 
Grande do Sul, a close cooperation between the industry and that they work structured 
to establish cooperation between businesses. What might be helpful, on the other 
hand, is drawing on Norway’s experiences of cooperation to get university milieus, 
research and education in connection towards the industry that is to as the  Norwegian 
model for R&D. It is by many claimed that Norwegian-based oil supply and service 
industry’s world leading edge is largely thanks to these regional cluster environments 
that built a domestic industry (Fiksdahl, Hannisdal, Wangen interview). Three-way 
cooperation is quite underdeveloped in Brazil. Basically, Wangen explains, most 
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industry companies focus on their own tasks toward Petrobras, and occasionally in 
collaboration with the universities. Technology is however driven inside Petrobras, 
and need to develop an independent industry around it is pressing.  
 
5.C3 Aspects Concerning Rio Subsea Cluster 
 
The fact that Innovation Norway is one of the coordinators of the NCE program 
creates benefits for exchange of experiences with Brazil. Senior Advisor Andersen in 
the Rio Office is responsible for communicating the NCE Subsea model to Brazilian 
counterparts. He never recommends what one should do, but simply inform how it is 
done it Norway. There are multiple reasons as to why he might encourage the 
development of Rio Subsea cluster. 
 
First of all, clusters attract resources necessary for clusters and positive for Norwegian 
subsea suppliers. In terms of FDI, workforce, competition, local buzz and global 
pipelines – all factors which arguably could prove crucial to attract for Rio de Janeiro 
to grow as a subsea hotspot.  
Sub secretary of Rio de Marcelo Vertis announced that “the cooperation initiated with 
the signing of the MoU gives the Norwegian subsea companies a privileged position 
in Brazil”. As we have seen, many of them already do. Nevertheless, Fiksdahl and 
Andersen are pleased to hear such a promising statement from the state and agree that 
its signal value carry weight. Ultimately, Wangen points out that there must be a 
match between members of the NCE Subsea and the relevant businesses located 
around Rio de Janeiro. The Subsea Index, a matchmaking tool created by NCE 
Subsea and several Brazilian partners in 2012, might be efficient in discovering 
potential partnerships (NBCC, 2013).  
 
Several of the respondents indicate that a major problem is lack of personnel rather 
than orders and that it merely a question of resources to meet the local demands. It 
may therefore be little incentive to spend resources to focus on research and 
disruptive innovations as company sustainability is maintained regardless. 
 
	   69	  
5.C5 Cultural Hinders 
 
What became visible throughout the process of collecting primary and secondary data 
was a general underestimation of how sincere the cultural differences between the two 
nations is and how it cause friction in all levels of interaction. A report prepared for 
Innovation Norway on How to do business in Brazil state that “mismanaged cultural 
issues are one of the main contributing factors to failed establishments and 
unsuccessful market entries in Brazil” (Inventure Management, 2013). The 
perceivably “soft” aspect of culture gets a different flavor when miscommunications 
directly cause losses amounting to millions.  
The business environment is highly colored by creating relationships on a personal 
level with the costumers, and meetings are generally held face to face -over and over 
and over again. Following this, continuous presence is key to maintain and develop 
client relationships. Sufficient trust to do business is delicate, timely and difficult to 
achieve in Brazil.  Upon being asked; “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or do you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”, 
According to a survey performed by ASEP/JDS, Norway scores the highest in the 
world on interpersonal trust. In Brazil on the other hand, the majority reply that you 
can never be too careful.  Long-term efforts in building trust and relations are 
therefore crucial to get anywhere and require customization for transaction-based 
business culture like the Norwegian.  
 
Vasconcellos exemplifies by range the importance of feelings towards different 
institutions in the following order by priority; yourself – family – company – country. 
Andersen backs his point and claim that the ownership structure in Brazilian 
companies is scarred by recent historic instabilities and insecurity. Hyperinflation and 
sudden political changes has caused a culture for taking profits out of the company as 
opposed to re-investing surplus back into the company. This might also explain the 
reluctance observed by the private companies investing in R&D. Generally speaking; 
the business culture is shaped by the need to look out for one self, rather than the 
company and country. 
 
Wangen describes Brazil as a very “association oriented” country. He has the 
impressions that the Brazilians have the attitude “yes we want to join, but why do we 
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have to pay for my membership?”. The attitude is quite different from Norway where 
one is accustomed to pay half of the costs, and in turn financed half by innovation 
Norway and the Research Council16. Again, the willingness to participate could be 
seen as a different evaluation of risk. There are tax incentives to stimulate cluster 
commitment and R&D investment, but it seems that the industry is still haltering to 
truly be on board with the idea (Medina and Melo interview). 
 
One way to avoid uncertainty is by defining all possible scenarios at a very detailed 
level. Responsibilities, authorities and tasks tend to be more clearly defined than 
viewed necessary by Norwegians. The relatively flat organizational structure may also 
arrive on a collision course with the high power distance culture in Brazil. The 
hierarchical distance implies that subordinates should be involved in processes and 
decisions, and their supervisor usually assigns all tasks. Hoftede’s Power distance 
index measures the extent to which members of the organization expect and accept 
that power is distributed unequally. It is important to catch the fact that it captured the 
willingness and possibilities to take independent initiatives defined from below, a 
feature central to cluster synergies. According to the GINI index, a common method 
for measuring inequality in distribution of income or consumption expenditure among 
the population, Brazil and Norway represent opposite poles. By speaking with the 
Brazilians employed in Innovation Norway Rio, it was expressed that features of the 
fairly flat structure, visible for example by the normality of speaking directly to their 
superior, is highly appreciated. A friend working on a shipyard in Rio told me that 
they face regular delays, as the workers are unwilling to take event the smallest 
decisions without consulting its supervisor, who then will ask the following 
supervisor, in terror of having responsibility if something were to happen. Rune 
Andersen claims that such individual responsibility is highly destructive in the 
Brazilian labor market. 
 
 
 
5.C6 Conclusion institutional opportunities 
 
There are many examples of successful clusters in Brazil, among them the shipyard 
cluster in Rio Grande do Sul. The University island is truly unique in its nature as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 OECD statistics from 2012 reveal that Industry-financed public R&D expenditures (per GDP) in 
Norway is well above the OECD average. 
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elements from the TH is located within proximity; SME are established as spinoffs 
from the UFRJ, moved to the incubator to grow with access to laboratories in the 
Technology Park and the University labs. The Park host a combination of large 
multinationals and local SMEs and the anchor company Petrobras has cooperation 
agreement with many of the members, and 50 years of cooperation ties with UFRJ. 
Apparently, this should testimony that Rio de Janeiro has a solid foundation to 
formally develop and manage the Rio Subsea Cluster. Yet, there seem to be an x-
factor hindering acceleration and it might be culturally determined. For NCE Subsea’s 
mantra “Cooperate when you can, compete when you must”, trust between and 
contribution from the actors are prerequisite.  The problem arises, as the NCE Subsea 
cluster model does not cope with some of the main characteristics in the Brazilian 
landscape. The main objective is thus to improve the “top-down” policies to 
counterbalance some of the inhibiting effects of the current situation. Again, even 
tough transferal of the Norwegian cluster model is	  inappropriate, one may still utilize 
the feature of applied science to better implement the R&D policies. 
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
This thesis has aimed at answering the problem defined as: 
 
“How can NCE Subsea Contribute to Research and Development in the Brazilian 
Subsea Supply Chain?” 
 
Results reveal that a variety of factors, directly and indirectly, have an effect on R&D 
in the Brazilian subsea supply chain. However, only two outcomes can be defended 
properly, namely the contribution to qualified workers and applied science. As for 
development in technology, my research only indicates weak contribution to the local 
subsea supply chain. The Brazilian Cost is graphed to illustrate the self-sectioning of 
firms whose benefits exceed the inconveniences to overcome barriers, while 
participating in the Brazilian market. The barriers come in many forms, but especially 
worth mentioning are the tax regime, bureaucracy, lack of qualified labor, cultural and 
language differences. The process is graphically sketched in the below figure. 
 
 
Figure 17: How NCE Subsea contribute to R&D in the Brazilian Supply Chain. (Source: The Author). 
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Subsequently, as defended initially, the research question is broken down and we ask; 
 
1. How can members of NCE Subsea contribute to R&D in the Brazilian Subsea 
Sector? 	  Many	  of	  the	  members	  of	  NCE	  Subsea	  bring	  substantial	  technology	  useful	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  subsea	  sector.	  It	  this	  point	  in	  development,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  more	  important	  that	  the	  SMEs	  adapt	  existing	  products	  to	  fit	  the	  specification	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  market.	  Alternatively,	  that	  Petrobras	  set	  specifications	  to	  fit	  the	  products	  and	  services	  the	  Norwegian	  companies	  can	  meet,	  which	  is	  much	  likely	  in	  the	  case	  of	  FPSOs.	  	  Capacity	  constraints	  imply	  that	  mobilizing	  the	  supply	  chain	  surpasses	  heavy	  research	  in	  terms	  of	  development	  in	  the	  subsea	  sector.	  The	  transfer	  of	  technology	  outcome	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  dashed	  line	  because	  certain	  factors	  bound	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Cost	  entail	  that	  export	  may	  in	  several	  cases	  be	  a	  more	  profitable	  mode	  of	  internationalization	  for	  the	  suppliers,	  particularly	  the	  case	  of	  	  SMEs.	  Accordingly,	  spillover	  effects	  are	  considerable	  reduced.	  Naturally,	  the	  OLI-­‐framework	  give	  room	  for	  firm-­‐specific	  assessment,	  and	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  firm	  that	  already	  have	  strong	  ties	  to	  companies	  present	  in	  Rio	  is	  likely	  to	  impact	  the	  decision.	  	  I	  find	  that	  radical	  innovations	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  a	  result	  of	  direct	  technology	  cooperation	  with	  CENPES	  or	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  BN21,	  which	  hopefully	  will	  give	  positive	  results.	  According	  to	  cluster	  theory,	  the	  rational	  behind	  STI,	  and	  practical	  experiences	  from	  collaborative	  research	  programs	  such	  as	  VISTA	  advocates	  that	  radical	  innovation	  are	  often	  found	  by	  bringing	  players	  and	  milieus	  together.	  These	  cooperative	  agreements	  are	  likely	  to	  foster	  dynamics,	  and	  sub-­‐dynamics,	  across	  players	  in	  the	  subsea	  industry.	  The	  SMEs	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  are	  not	  so	  dependent	  on	  external	  expertise	  and	  research	  will	  largely	  be	  undergone	  within	  the	  firm,	  or	  together	  with	  its	  local	  partner.	  I	  hold	  no	  doubt	  that	  Rio	  could	  become	  the	  cradle	  of	  groundbreaking	  subsea	  innovations.	  Leading	  industry	  members,	  sufficient	  financing,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  new	  solutions	  is	  a	  powerful	  mixture.	  I	  am	  however	  reluctant	  as	  to	  the	  effects	  this	  will	  have	  on	  local	  development	  of	  subsea	  supply	  chain,	  as	  findings	  indicate	  that	  absorption	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capacity	  is	  still	  too	  low	  for	  manufacturing	  of	  such	  technology	  intensive	  solutions	  to	  take	  place	  in	  Brazil	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  Indirect	  effects	  caused	  by	  increased	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  cluster,	  is	  said	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  local	  milieu,	  and	  hence	  the	  supply	  chain.	  	  	  	  
It is an established fact that lack of competent workers is a pressing constraint, and 
something that is in everyone’s best interest to solve.  Aligned with objectives in LC 
requirements, all of my interviewees report that the vast majority employed are 
Brazilians. Without speculating whether LC is accelerating the efforts or not, it is safe 
to say that one does not have the option of “importing” workers, as might be the 
solution when it comes to material. Training programs and simulator centers are much 
used to prepare employees how to operate subsea equipment on vessels, to exemplify. 
Findings indicate that Norwegian FDI contribute to closing the gap of local 
competence by qualifying the local workforce offshore. 
 
As for manufacturing, some theory outlined in chapter 3.1 argues that spillover effects 
are likely to occur. It is not unreasonable to assume that members of NCE Subsea that 
produce parts of the product line in local facilities do contribute to qualifications of 
the employees, increase availability of local equipment, and so forth the development 
of the local supply chain. However, I do not hold sufficient evidence to claim such 
effect, and some of my sources actually claim otherwise; that the quality of locally 
produced equipment has not improved.  	  
2. How can NCE Subsea Cluster Model contribute to R&D in the Brazilian Subsea 
Sector? 
 
One cannot transfer the Norwegian model for R&D to another context, but they can 
draw on the experiences of cooperation across players. There seem to be 
fundamentally counteracting aspects in the Brazilian business culture that hinders 
optimal dynamic. Trust and	  ownership	  structure	  have	  previously	  been	  discussed.	  “Top-­‐down”	  polices	  in	  the	  Rio	  Subsea	  Cluster	  could	  aim	  to	  undermine	  effects	  of	  the	  current	  situation.	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It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  supply	  chain	  can	  benefit	  if	  the	  link	  between	  the	  industry	  and	  universities	  is	  strengthen	  and	  to	  a	  larger	  extent	  characterized	  by	  applied	  science.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  differenced	  between	  The	  NCE	  Subsea	  Cluster	  model	  and	  the	  TH	  applied	  in	  Brazil,	  is	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  innovations.	  If	  Rio	  Subsea	  Cluster	  is	  inspired	  by	  the	  Norwegian	  cluster	  model,	  it	  should	  imply	  that	  the	  universities	  conduct	  research	  more	  relevant	  for	  appliance	  in	  the	  market	  as	  projects	  are	  designed	  to	  solve	  problems	  identified	  by	  the	  company.	  The	  Government	  is	  united	  with	  relevant	  incentives	  to	  reduce	  the	  positive	  overlap	  between	  University	  and	  Government	  and	  increase	  the	  positive	  overlap	  between	  University	  and	  Industry.	  Sintef’s	  accreditation	  may	  bridge	  this	  movement	  and	  hence	  contribute	  to	  applied	  science	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  subsea	  sector.	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Appendix - Summary of interviews 
Appendix 1: Interview with Johanna Fiksdsdahl  
Representing: The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
Date: February 18th 2014 
Location: OED offices, Akersgata 59, Oslo 
 
Summary of interview 
 
Johanna started working in OED June 2013 - after the partnership between Brazil-
Norway on research oil and gas technology was initiated. Dr. Elias in MCTI 
suggested the cooperation during the former State Secretary Per Rune Henriksen’s 
visit to Brazil 2011. The reason for this proposal was that one recognized a mutual 
potential that would benefit both parties if efforts were aligned to face challenges 
together. Brazil and Norway face common challenges with regard to development of 
their offshore oil and gas resources, much advanced technology on each side, so why 
not build on this and create new technology together? The agreement has been 
negotiated for nearly two years, and Johanna together with the Norwegian delegation 
went to Rio in November where the State Secretary of the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, Kåre Fostervold, signed the agreement. She explained how the agreement 
called BN21 (Brazil-Norway in the 21st century) is a guide to the co-operation 
containing of a stakeholder task force and a government group, and they should work 
together to promote cooperation. 
Within the oil technology segments Statoil and Petrobras together have so far defined 
four TTAs (technology target areas) based on mutual challenges where both parties 
have something they can offer; subsea, increased/enhanced recovery, drilling of wells, 
geoscience (seismic section). BN21s vision is to establish a “subsea factory”, where 
modules are placed on the seabed. Hence, achieving increased production and 
lowering costs, in addition to the fact that there is no need for a workforce/crew to 
serve the platform. 
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In parallel with Statoil and Petrobras' collaborative work with MoU, the authorities 
involved are developing a "roadmap"; what will be delivered and when. OED values 
milestones such as the signing. Johanna and the Norwegian delegation is going back 
in March to discuss the mandates of the groups (specify the tasks) as well as 
continuing discussions between Statoil and Petrobras on the TTAs.  
Both the industry and the researchers are interested in participating; 
Industry: Statoil and Petrobras are nominated as Lead Parties. Nominated from 
Norwegian side : Statoil , DNVGL , Aker Solutions, FMC Kongsberg Subsea, NSA 
Academia: all Universities. University of Stavanger, NTNU , UiO , UiB 
Research institutions and funding: SINTEF, Research Council of Norway, IRIS,  
CNPq (the state agency under the MCTI and provides financing for researchers), 
FINEP . 
Additionally, the aim is to get the Brazilian supply chain on board, whereas many of 
them are Brazilian subsidiaries of Norwegian bound companies (Norwegian 
companies have a local presence in Brazil is perceived for bras company). Traditional 
Brazilian suppliers have been somewhat immature, but they have very ambitious 
investment plans and construction is at full speed (less developed infrastructure in 
terms of the number of yards needed). She reminds me that we actually spent 40 years 
building ours! 
I ask her where to find the expertise to build this industry and she claims that there is 
a knowledge cluster forming that foreign companies want to take part in. The federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) is heavily involved in research mainly due to its 
close relationship with Petrobras’ research center CENPES (located in immediate 
proximity to UFRJ). Large, multinational suppliers have established research centers 
in the Technology Park, also located on the university island, and co-operation with 
the university is likely. She points out that there is no coincidence that SINTEFs first 
overseas office is in Rio de Janeiro. 
We discussed the reasons that the OED and the government devote resources to 
establish close ties to Brazil and Johanna points to two major reasons: 
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1.   Technology. Brazil as a research laboratory. Petrobras is in front within deep-water. 
They were the first and only oil company able to first discover and extract the pre-salt 
oil. Huge funds earmarked for research controlled by ANP through the 1% rule that 
allows all companies are required to use my 1% of revenue on R&D (0.5% within the 
company and externally 0.5% (uni, research)). The entire oil industry is used as an 
industrial and community builder to not only create an oil industry, but a wider 
context to create jobs and build infrastructure and improve education. 
2.    Size. Very large offshore market with turnover of more than NOK 27 billion for the 
Norwegian supply industry. Expected to grow ahead of the Norwegian continental 
shelf in 2014. Together the two will be the largest offshore markets, representing 
more than $ 400 billion. Brazil is the third most important market for 
internationalization of the supply industry, after South Korea and Great Britain. The 
relationship between Norway and Brazil is nothing new; there have been strong ties 
for several decades. Pre-salt discoveries open up great opportunities for the oil 
industry, with its large demand for goods and services. Petrobras is supposed to build 
21 drilling ships (7 is already delivered) and other business structure that involves a 
huge market for providers of goods and services. There has been a rise in the number 
of foreign companies, but we have seen that it takes patience to be in the market. In 
the future, perhaps players are drawn elsewhere, with USA signaling changes in the 
Mexico gulf and new areas in Australia. The situation is no longer as euphoric as in 
2006 and 2007 when everyone was going to Brazil!  Many companies are still 
interested in investing in Brazil, but they have a more realistic approach than in 2006 
in connection with the pre-salt discoveries. These findings contributed to create a 
bubble in which many companies were drawn to the Brazilian market. However, due 
to the licensing round being paused for almost five years, many started to feel 
uncertainty towards the market, and other markets seemed more attractive to invest in. 
As a result, one can say that Brazil missed a window of opportunity that pre-salt 
helped to create. 
Johanna’s thesis concluded that LC requirements led to industrial development to 
some extent. However, it reduced the pace of development of the market. Few can 
disagree that LC can be a sustainable tool for industry development, given that the 
local content is based on principles to enhance competitiveness. The outcome of 
unfavorable policies might give the industry crutches. Statistically, Norwegian 
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investment increased remarkably from around 2009 to 2011, which might seem a bit 
contra dictionary as the new framework built on stricter LC requirements came into 
force in 2010 (Production -sharing contracts in pre-salt biddings). She argue that at 
the time of the first pre-salt rounds there was perhaps an uncertainty in the market, but 
that the situation has normalized 
OEDs impression from talking to companies is dedication to local content. One has to 
deliver locally; there is no other way to do it and it eventually induces companies to 
have a local presence in Brazil. The ship owners’ association (Rederiforbundet) 
reports that it is up to 100 % requirements for local crew, Rederiforbundet is looking 
into how to create a simulator center for training of personnel and they will be 
involved in developing the skills needed. She has the impression that ANP has made 
slight moderations on request Petrobras. For example, the fact is that unless the 
product is available locally so you can import it. Norway applied similar policies with 
moderation. 
During her time working at OED, she has learned that one must see the picture 
through a more historical lens. Brazil less developed infrastructure in terms of the 
number of yards needed. Norway was lucky as it was many yards available, 
something Brazil did not have (does not have) and the situation is completely 
different. Norway has a very different educational level than Brazil and the lack of 
qualified knowledge in the industry is a major problem. Qualified labor is a scarce, 
and it is challenging to change all this in such short time! The regulatory framework is 
still being tested and they are still figuring out how it best should be applied. She 
reflects that the impression she got after having been there in November is that 
despite everything, this large market can not be ignored! You can complain all you 
want, things take time, but the fact is that if you want to work with the oil industry 
you should be in Brazil, and hence deal with the requirements and be patient.  
When I ask in which specific areas of expertise Norwegian companies are stronger 
than Brazilian, she clearly dismisses my question and reply ”It is not about who's the 
strongest, but how to be strong together”. As we have common challenges in the 
resource base that is relevant both to the Norwegian continental shelf and the 
Brazilian continental shelf: long distances from shore, subsea activity, much similar to 
the geology in the Arctic. There is interest from both parties, as well as research, 
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industry, universities. In addition, Petrobras in many ways in the front and pushes the 
technological limits forward. It is in this case, Norway can learn to utilize their 
achievements, despite the fact we have a longer tradition of having an oil industry. 
  
She tells that the University of Oslo (UiO) has experienced tenfold increase in 
applications from Brazilian students who will come to Norway. There is also an 
increased interest from the Brazilian authorities (including ANP), and several 
delegations have visited OED, the oil directorate (OD) and so forth to exchange 
experiences on the Authority's role in industrial development. We should not think 
that we should move the Norwegian model to Brazil, because we are in a completely 
different stage in development than Brazil is today. One cannot transfer the model to 
another context, but they can draw on our experiences of cooperation across players 
(Authorities, suppliers and research institutions = "Norwegian model for 
R&D").  Petrobras is a very strong player individually, however need to develop an 
industry around it. “The Norwegian model” and our experiences in building an 
domestic industry is an interesting model for them in this sense. The Norwegian-
based oil supply and service industry is the world leader in a number of areas (73 % 
market share in subsea, 90% in drilling segment) and it is largely thanks to cluster 
environments (collaboration between the different actors ) . 
Her impression on behalf of the OED is that having signed an agreement on paper is 
of large symbolic value, serves as a catalyst for collaboration between the private 
sector and indicates that this is something worth prioritizing. Petrobras said that they 
would only continue cooperation with Statoil when the agreement with the ministries 
was signed.  She points to the interactive cluster co-operation which is appearing in 
areas in Brazil, and how it makes the market much more attractive. 
She is certain that Brazil will be a very important partner for Norwegian industry in 
the years to come. It's now it all starts! Pre-salt will not be in production for 20 years, 
and before that there will be a need for very large investments. 
Requested clarifications received by email May 22nd 2014: 
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-It was created uncertainty in the market after the pre - salt discoveries, because 
licensing rounds were put on hold for five years. This uncertainty appears to have 
decreased since the new rules came into place, but still there will be changes in the 
rules - for example, when it comes to local content. It that it is natural to have some 
"bumps" in the road after such a tremendous hype as pre-salt helped to create, and the 
unrest has not settled completely. Petrobras has sincere challenges connected to 
capacity constraints, and their weak confidence to investors. However, ANP has 
already made changes to make demands and expectations more realistic. 
 
As regards to the importance of the agreements at government level, it is definitely 
more important in some countries, such as Brazil. In other countries, such as Brazil, 
the industry engages in technology cooperation on their own (without help from the 
authorities). Petrobras said that they would continue their discussions with the group 
before the contract was signed. It is therefore essential to anchoring of political 
leadership - especially considering that Petrobras is still a politicized company. In this 
way BN21 Agreement works as a door opener for Norwegian companies interested in 
Brazil. In addition, we considered it important to establish cooperation with Brazil 
because there is a growing research laboratory, partly because the state has actively 
advocated that the oil companies' revenues will be directed toward research. 	  
Appendix 2: Interview with Terese Fuglerud and Anders Kapstad  
Representing: Panoro Energy do Brasil Ldta. 
Date: February 28th 2014 
Location: Panoro Energy Brasil Office, Praia do Botafogo, RJ 
 
Summary of Interview 
 
Panoro moved the HQ from Oslo to Rio in 2012 in line with its strategic commitment 
in Brazil. The company intended to participate in the 11th licensing round held in 
2013. Effort and preparations were made and a good technical team was in place prior 
to the bidding. However, partly due to three unsuccessful drillings [dry holes] 
conducted in 2012, the company decided not to invest more money into in Brazil and 
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hope to have pulled out of the market within summer 2014. They concluded that 
Brazil was too complicated. The Brazilian business environment is far more immature 
than predicted and envisioned.  They describe the market as very costly due to 
restrictions, slow progress, inefficiency and extensive bureaucracy. The authorities 
and the ANP are heavily overgrown and Petrobras is too dominating. They 
underestimated how long it takes to build an independent industry, and on top of that 
burdens it with tax and import tariffs. It is not to say that they lack the skills or 
capacity to do it, but they do not have respect in regards to how much time it will take 
or attitude to do it. 
Although the LC (local content) requirements have not affected Panoro much as they 
are an investor and do not produce anything, they observe that it affects everything. 
They notice a ruling consensus among foreign firms taking part in the Brazilian oil 
sector that the original plan is unreasonable and they are happy to see small signs of 
adjustments. LC is principally a solution to support, but it causes trouble in Brazil due 
to the low level of general education and infrastructure. The Brazilians with the 
demanded expertise (finance and technology) can consequently demand very high 
salaries. The majority of the employees in Panoro were Brazilian. The people that do 
hold relevant education are generally very talented – the problem is to catch them. 
Many of the workers with technical (geologists etc) background were recruited from 
Petrobras.  
  
Even so, they think that the large cultural differences are perhaps the largest 
challenge. The Brazilians simply “have an other commercial understanding than we in 
we are used to in the northern hemisphere”. They work differently and have a 
different attitude towards doing business. The culture is relatively defensive in 
solving problems and the difficulties lie in the local human nature.  Somewhat 
humoristically, it is pointed out that one have to be paranoid to operate a business in 
Brazil. The agent/local leader must be hands-on constantly and represent the culture. 
If not, you are without a chance to succeed. As they work and think totally opposite of 
what we are used to – sending an agent fronting the company culture is a cost you 
have to take. Most Norwegian companies have realized that operation in Brazil cannot 
be remotely controlled and reported by just anyone. They are less direct and less 
impatient, foreigners are perhaps a bit discriminated against [naturally, as anywhere 
else]. One must remember that it is somewhat unrealistic to compare Brazil with 
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Norway’s 5mill and high GDP per person. It calls for totally different realities and 
one must have it in mind and be a little humble about it. 
 
Panoro is a relatively small oil company with approximately 30 employees in the Rio 
office a few years back. Upon being asked about challenges related to its size, they 
both agree that it makes it harder to participate in the Brazilian oil market. Given 
Petrobras’ dominant role, the voice of a small company will rarely be heard. They are 
not prioritized, and it is very demanding to provide enough capital to cover risk 
premium and maintain a strong balance.   
 
Upon being asked about the Rio cluster and the value to many local Norwegian 
organizations and institutions, they underline that the NBCC is quite valuable as a 
network. The Norwegian government is a door opener and a bridge-builder, but there 
is “no free lunch”. The market is here, they have the resources and talented people, 
but face large challenges in the system: the people’s attitudes, corruption, and 
bureaucracy. Many locale believe there is a need for international expertise, but they 
have not learned to work in the western way. Panoro work with locale partners and 
internal partners (on the same license), in-house knowledge and external consultants 
for knowledge. Depending on the license, Panoro may offer analysis of risk and 
seismic data. This knowledge sharing is standard and not specific to Brazil. 
  
As a concessionaire, the 1% rule applies to Panoro. They explain that they in 
collaboration with Sintef Brasil discussed what project to spend the R&D money on 
and Sintef proposed a process to accomplish it. Sintef got acceptance from ANP to go 
forth with the project funded by Panoro. It encompasses a project that they themselves 
can take advantage of - a geological project. SINTEF has found a sensible niche in the 
bras market.  Upon being asked about the likelihood for them to spend resources on 
R&D in Brazil, they note that Panoro is too small for that focus, but for larger 
companies - it may be sensible. It exists some useful schemes / programs socially to 
get tax deductions. 
 
They note that Panoro’s future in Brazil was never certain even if the explorations 
proved successful. The general appetite for investments is reduced and nothing will 
change the fact that Brazil represents a difficult market to operate in overnight. 
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Everything is “syrup”, but it is moving slowly in the right direction. 
 
Appendix 3: Interview with Gulbrand Wangen 
Represent: INTSOK 
Date: March 17th and 20th 2014 
Location: Innovation Norway house Rio, Rio Torre do Sul, RJ 
 
Summary of interview 
 
Wangen gives a short introduction to the idea behind the establishment of INTSOK 
and its purpose. INTSOK promote its members’ competencies considered important 
for oil industry abroad collectively. When INTSOK was formed in 1997, we saw a 
recession in the Norwegian shelf, but knew we had a great technological competence 
that needed to be profiled. The question was: can we can sell it internationally? In 
1997 the international revenues for Norwegian suppliers was approximately NOK 17 
billion and in 2012 NOK 183 billion, however INTSOK facilitates and created 
meeting places, but can not say how much this increased is thanks to INTSOK. 
Looking at offshore investment and expenses, Brazil is the largest and Norway the 
second; therefore many opportunities for Norwegian suppliers. Brazil is therefore 
prioritized as a “main market”. 
He explains technology within the Norwegian industry which is particularly attractive 
abroad and gives me a short and precise introduction to the five major areas 
(interactions) in which Norway do business in the Brazilian oil and gas market: 
  
1.    Subsea; Brasil and Norway are set benchmark within subsea, and employ pretty 
similar expertise. (Also by having one dominant national oil company, Statoil 85% of 
Norwegian market, Petrobras 90% of the Brazilian). One must remember that these 
are international companies; Brazilian in Brazil, Norwegian in Norway, and the 
reporting does not go directly to Norway and R&D is decided locally in the Brazilian 
market.  The only exception he can think of is Aker Solution which has a reporting 
line to the HQ in Norway. Hence, technology transfers in that sense is not so relevant 
as the governance and control is usually not directed from Norway. 
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2.     Drilling rigs construction. Sete Brasil delivering 28 drilling rigs to Petrobras, worlds 
biggest rigproject set out to five shipyards. Shipyards have signed contracts with 
NODE cluster in south of Norway won all contracts (Aker Solutins Drilling 
Technolgy and NOV Varco) Water, rocks, presaltlayer – everything needed to get 
through this will be delivered by two Norwegian companies. This is pure technology-
sale on specified technology and contracts won on sale and no technology was 
developed. 
3.     Offshore Maritime. 25% of all ships in relation to the platform supply in Brazil is 
Norwegian controlled (ancherhandeling etc.). Dynamic Positioning (DP) both for 
supply vessels and drilling rigs: won contracts on equipment (Kongsberg Maritime). 
These contracts are standards and the timeframe is 2-5 years and this is established 
because it takes that much time to build this rig. 
4.     FPSO a big Brazilian market and some companies with links to Norway are eager to 
win contracts. 12-15 FPSO are scheduled during the next 4-8 years. INTSOK are 
trying to present new solutions for Petrobras which are not yet specified. In this sense 
we are talking development of technology, as this is knowledge familiar to the 
Norwegian companies (use it in other locations such as South Korea) but not present 
in Brazil. In addition, Libra pre-salt project need 12-15 FPSOs, hence there are many 
possibilities in expanding its sales. Two more companies worth mentioning that 
represent a technology cooperation between Norway and Brazil. BW Offshore 
(Skøyen, Oslo, Main Office Singapore) some tenders run from Oslo and Singapore. 
TeeKay Petrojarl operate FPSOs in Brazil partly managed from Norway.  
5.     Drilling operations: Five shipyards have contractors from Sete Brazil. Rig operators 
such as Norwegian Odfjell will invest in construction and operate after rigs are 
built.  Long term contract with Petrobras ensures that it is the contractor interest that 
the rig is build with quality equipment. Odfjell drilling Brazilian subsidiary contracted 
by Petrobras on three rigs, will own and operate 20% of the rigs when completed. To 
get in position, Oddfjell are investing during the construction. Seadrill is no longer 
HQ in Stavanger, moved to London last year.  
Although research cooperation is just a small part of the whole Norway-Brazil 
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relationship, he underlines that Sintef’s accreditation is very important for further 
development. Industry development and research development is not necessary 
parallel in this industry, so it is important that Sintef complements the other 
operations. 
  
Wangen is impressed by the way they work with clusters in Rio Grande do Sul and 
claims that it is more advanced (at least comparative) to cluster work in Norway. In 
the recent workshop arranged by INTSOK with visits to shipyards in Rio Grande do 
Sul he observed close co-operation between industry and that they work structured to 
establish cooperation between businesses. However, not as good at three-way co-
operation in Brazil, to get university milieus, research and education in connection 
towards the industry. Every industry company focus on their own tasks toward 
Petrobras, and then sometimes together with the universities. Technology is driven 
inside Petrobras (Statoil more cooperative towards the industry). We have been much 
better at creating strong relations between costumer, suppliers, and universities: new 
technologies, new challenges! They are trying to copy and become like us in that area. 
  
One would think that the cluster in Møre should partner up with the cluster in Rio 
Grande do Sul as they both represent shipyard clusters. However, the companies 
selling to shipyards in Rio Grande do Sul may come from everywhere in Norway, not 
only come from Møre [Two comp Palfinger, Norsafe (M&A with local comp]! Not 
given that there is a match for cluster cooperation. The key is to find a cluster that is 
“similar to oneself”.  He claims that we do not have a harmonized subsea cluster in 
Norway. NCE subsea in Bergen runs the operations and subsea valley on the 
technology.  
  
Wangen agreed that culture difference might hinder the drive for cluster development 
and value creation. One must stimulate and create motives for the firms to join forces 
and work towards common goal. Very “association oriented” country, they are 
members, but do not intend to contribute. He has the impressions that the Brazilians 
have the attitude “yes we want to join, but why do I have to pay?”. Difference: in 
Norway you must pay half of the costs, but you will be financed half by innovation 
Norway and research council. The cluster structure here is much more complex and 
lack commitment. There are tax incentives for cluster investments, but it seems that 
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the industry is still haltering to truly be on board with the idea. 
  
INTSOKs role in Rio Cluster is that it is interesting for partner members and the local 
companies to take part of the cluster. Required that our members fit businesses in Rio. 
To find business, but you must offer technology that is worth something in the 
market. 
We are the international cluster of Norwegian competence and will profile this 
globally. We do not work internally to build the members, we promote them abroad. 
We have proven that when we present our members within subsea segment together, 
they will win contracts abroad. All the time the focus is towards the clients. We could 
work with the cluster in Brazil, for example by arranging a workshop, because it is 
easier to get connected to the clients. However, we do not look at a cluster as 
important/necessary for internationalization, but a convenient facilitator. 
  
We discuss the recent announcement from Petrobras’ CEO messaging that keeping up 
with the production curve is more important than meeting LC requirements. LC is 
intended to spur more production and fabrication in Brazilian companies, but the 
results does not keep up with the increasing demand. If you drive it to hard, you will 
not get access to all available technology because it is too demanding to insert it in the 
Brazilian market. Many firms, especially SMB do not have capacity to enter because 
of the strict LC requirements. 
  
I ask for his thoughts on the gap between the reported Investment figures published in 
Rystad [for INTSOK] compared to numbers published by Inventure Management [for 
Innovation Norway]. Rystad, as a consultant feel that the Petrobras’ strategic plan will 
not be met and have therefore reduced the forecasted investment figures. This is also 
why the agreement with GIEK is still on hold. The recommendation of the Board that 
it is too risky to provide credit guarantees as some of the boats are ordered before the 
shipyard is built and that petrobras have a history of not meeting schedule.   
 
Appendix 4: Interview with Kjetil Solbrække  
Representing: Sintef do Brasil 
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Date: March 14rd 2014 
Location: Skype (Kjetil is permanently located in Rio, but was in Norway at the time) 
 
Summary of interview 
 
SINTEF's first major engagement abroad is in fact in Rio de Janeiro. Kjetil explains 
that opportunities would be lost if not positioned in the market and Sintef being in 
Brazil is tantamount to being involved in technology development.  So far the 
Norwegian continental shelf have been pioneers of technology development in 
offshore oil production. The current reality is deeper water and even tougher 
challenges in Brazil. To be part of this, and be able to we bring our expertise from the 
north sea into a new breakthrough area, will prove important for technology 
development going forward.  Brazil a one of the most exciting areas in the world to 
develop the technology at the moment.  
 
Sintef’s competitive advantage in the Brazilian market is its knowledge about a 
research process, for which Kjetil experience a demand.  Only in exceptional cases 
depending on the projects do Sintef assists with specific knowledge / expertise: this is 
not the core activity. Historically, Brazilian institutions have not engaged in applied 
research. All research is being done in the universities -which are excellent- but there 
is no applied science. There are plenty of scientists who research for its own sake. 
CENPES manage and conduct research based exclusively on the needs of Petrobras to 
create value. Everything else that does not have a direct positive effect will not be 
given priority.  
He points out that this gives SINTEF in a unique position as a research institution, 
being the only research institution in brazil that can conduct applied research projects 
for the industry.  SINTEFs niche is not concrete technology that in the true sense, but 
we hold the knowledge of running research projects. From SINTEF Norway, we bring 
the experience of undertaking major research projects; provide a solution for the 
client, follow deadlines, report quarterly, follow budgets. dialogue with customers.  
 
Sintef’s work is purely innovative. By generating access to counselors, expertise, new 
perspectives, innovative thinking, new information is created and applied.  
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The business model is similar to the one in Norway. Our employees are constantly 
developing as they are exposed to new missions regularly. To date we have around 20 
researchers – of which 90% of employees are Brazilian - in their spacious Rio offices, 
and seek to increase to 50-100 in a 3-5 year period.  Brazil is a large country with 
interesting, talented people that we are recruiting for SINTEF both in Brazil and 
possibly Norway.  He argues that we can clearly draw on bras knowledge. They are 
hiring young graduates deliberately because they are easy to shape young.  
 
Petrobras has set several world records when it comes to deep water operations. 
Hence, Brazil is a very competent country where SINTEF certainly can learn a lot 
also in terms of its Norwegian operations. 
 
Petrobras’ research center, CENPES is the principal partner with whom we conduct 
projects. They say what they want to know, we propose a plan, and they provide 
corrections to what we should do. The project for Petrobras is primarily related to 
multiphase flow.  
 
Kjetil highlights that they have a good and close cooperation with the universities in 
Rio (URFJ, PUC, Catholic University).  
 
Sintef is a foundation, not a company. This corporate form prevents it from 
transferring revenues to the Norwegian unit. This is highly unusual in the Brazilian 
context for a research institution to be a foundation, but the form opens possibilities 
for funding.  Companies operating offshore Brazil, must spend at least one percent of 
revenues from on R&D in Brazil. The money is managed by ANP in a sizeable 
"Special Participation Fund" (SPF). Foreign corporations cannot access this pot. Last 
April Sintef was given a public accreditation, which gives us a right to apply for 
project funding from the Fund.  Minimum half of the "1% " shall be used in 
accredited universities and research institutes. Both projects SINTEF Brazil have 
received, and the research funding foundation has applied for, is attached to this 
scheme. 
 
Appendix 5: Interview with Rune Andersen  
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Representing: Innovation Norway in Rio de Janeiro 
Date: March 28th 2014 
Location: Innovation Norway house Rio, Rio Torre do Sul, RJ 
 
Summary of interview 
 
Innovation Norway and the Norwegian cluster program are organized as follows. IN 
have the ARENA program, with small clusters (many are qualified) and many of 
these are perhaps strong enough to be given the status NCE. However, this is a matter 
of budget constraints and only 12 NCEs can receive funding. Next step is becoming a 
Global Centers of expertise (GCE) of which there are 4 and NCE Subsea is a 
candidate.  
 
Why Rio want assistance from Norway is explained because Norway is strategically 
important for Brazil within oil and gas. CENPES is world leading within deepwater. 
Petrobras is a cluster in itself, but need the rest of the industry that is supposed to 
deliverer products and services to Petrobras. And due to LC requirements, they need 
to attract the supply chain to Brazil.  
 
When being asked how Innovation Norway is promoting the Norwegian cluster 
model, he sais that they say YES every time anyone ask to have a presentation etc. 
They never tell Brazilians how they should do it; only how we do it in Norway, and 
what have been successful in Norway. Our main tool is information to the board of 
directors in to the Norwegian companies, have programs to gather interested and 
relevant companies. After the process, it is up top the company to find a niche to 
penetrate the market.  
 
He explains the declined interest from the Norwegian companies to enter the 
Brazilian market is a result of increased investments and possibilities in the North 
Sea. Many have therefore put Brazil “on hold”. He believes that there is room for 
them in the Brazilian market.  
 
The Brazilian institutions are solid, well-constructed, a lot of knowledge is present. 
Perhaps too many institutions, but then again Brazil is 200 million and not 5 as in 
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Norway – so it is difficult to compare. He walks me through the major programs and 
structure of the governmental organs devoted to research based on a presentation 
given by Mr. Elias (as referred to several times in the thesis). Previously, nobody 
spoke with eachother and research were conducted more or less individually in each 
area, on municipal, state and federal level. PACTI was a program made to collect 
these loose threads, which he claims they have managed to do, taking into 
consideration that they are 200 million people. Collaboration, universities, financing, 
education and other actors that are focused on the same.   
 
Why should the old industry go into an area they do not know – the oil sector?  
Petrobras is trying to mobilize supplychain. The competence lay in universities. All 
universities have a TTO - technology transfer office that takes care of 
commercialization and control the patents.  Brazil is competitive in other traditional 
industries such as aircraft and mining, but has not been adapting to the nascent oil 
industry because they do not have the same pressure as Norway did. The companies 
must want to change, no one can force them to change. Incentives and schemes is a 
tool that can be used more to get these companies to adapt their technology base to be 
applied in the oil and gas sector. First of all they need the knowledge to do it. 
Secondly, the process to be certified by ANP an approved supplier takes a long time 
and is very thorough.  
  
The reason why Brazil lack a supply chain is due to ownership structure in businesses. 
The industry did not focus on oil related production and besides Petrobras – the 
“gigantic amimal” – there is no one else. He underlines how big Petrobras is by 
exemplifying that the recent tender offer was larger than Statoil. Plus, one need to 
keep in mind that this is a highly investment intensive sector. Petrobras has thousands 
of projects ongoing, they do not need more research projects. Additionally, it is very 
resource demanding for Petrobras to take part and operate in all concessions with 
minimum 30%.  
 
He claims that the 1% rule is used to build institutes, new equipment, labs and 
improve infrastructure in universities. Instead, should spend money to fill the 
institutes with people and projects.  Time to market from idea to production is very 
long. They lack a basic understanding that time is money in Brazil.  
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Upon being asked if there is a gap between university and the industry he says that the 
universities are not commercial; they do research. The effect of Sintef is too soon to 
say – they are currently too small. That Sintef is a foundation and not an institute 
created a problem for ANP as they are only familiar with public research. CNPq have 
not fully approved Sintef yet because of this.  
 
Rune argues that Brazil does not have a traditional foundation for cluster creation. 
Important features such as high trust index, culture for innovation and sharing, and 
horizontal organizational structures, are not present in the Brazilian cultural 
landscape. They are protectionist because of historic reasons. Portugal came to utilize 
their resources, and empty the country to bring the riches back to Portugal. 
 
He also highlights that only the Brazilians can lift the Brazilian market further.  
He describes the market as introvert, and that they have a protectionist behavior 
because the market is big enough. He jokingly claims that they lack the “Vågå-gene”, 
to say that globalization is not a crucial factor for Brazil to survive like it is for the 
people in Vågå. 
 
He illustrates the extent of the Brazilian bureaucracy and say that a business that in 
Norway would have 80% engineers and 20% economists would consist of 80% 
economists and 20% engineers in brazil. Example of the Brazilian cost: The hammer 
produced in Brazil was 40% more expensive than in Hamburg. But a Norwegian 
subsidiary holds a comparative advantage as only a part of your business is exposed 
to brazil, and does not loose the global competitive. Once established in Brazil, they 
compete by the same rules as the domestic companies. 
 
Appendix 6: Interview with Denise Medina and Leonardo Melo 
Representing: The Technology Park at Ilha do Fundao 
Date: April 3rd 2014 
Location: Parque Tecnológico UFRJ, Ilha da Cidade Universitária, RJ 
 
	   102	  
Summary of interview 
 
The Technology Park was established in 1997, and Oceantank (oceanlab) first 
resident 2003 (like the one in Trondheim). With pre-salt announcement in 2007, they 
noticed huge interest from all over the worlds. Multinationals from all over the world 
come here because CENPES is located here. They have long experience in research 
and their leading knowledge in pre-salt technology. Old partnerships such as 
Halliburton make it more natural to stay close. The future challenges cannot be 
resolved by only one country or company and high-tech companies is more easier to 
see the reason for collaboration.  
 
We move on to speak about the Subsea Rio cluster, and they stress the fact that they 
look so much to Norway in the way you organize the cluster. They explain that the 
Government took action to create subsea cluster. Currently the government are at the 
stage where they are deciding how to improve LC in technology, and make form a 
strategy on how to compete globally. It is necessary to establish cluster in RJ with 
focus on subsea technology because it is technical-intensive sector. For that it’s 
important to work with Norway institutionally and they see Norway as a reference. 
 
The interviewees wanted me to tell about the Norwegian experience, and how our 
way of organizing the cluster. We discuss the effects of government incentives to the 
industry to invest in R&D, and how Brazil best can boost this slowly appearing trend. 
We also talk about the cultural differences shaped by a history of a strong, centralized 
government controlling and funding all R&D activity hindering the willingness for 
firms to focus on R&D. Denise tells a story from Japan. “The Brazilians are very 
intelligent individually, but when they come together it difficult work together. 
Japanese people on the other hand, do not create value individually, but together they 
work very well”. Culture is something that do not change over night, but both are 
optimistic.  
 
They are asked on changes in regulatory framework and contribution by the industry 
in R&D investment. They see the effects of the law of innovation, which required the 
companies to invest 1% of revenue for investments in innovation. The park might be a 
result of the innovation law, as they have seen a good development since around 
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2007-2010. We exemplify it by Simens, that have a research plant here may put 50% 
in the URFJ laboratories (or other ANP-certified organizations), and the other in 
internal R&D activities on campus or in other facilities in Brazil (specialized people, 
new equipment). And the investment brings results, both for the firms and the 
students!  
Policies are changes in favor of innovation and expenses in investment R&D are tax 
deducted. The incentive is perhaps not strong enough, but they are slowly learning. 
Both agree that brazil is too bureaucratic, but are optimistic about the future changes 
regulation wise.  
 
Very interested to learn about the Norwegian experience, the Norwegian history of 
R&D. Upon being asked what specifically the NCE Subsea is interesting for them, 
they both agree on the business model and the structure the government participation. 
How to form a policy of business establishment. In Brazil, the Government is the 
driver of this policy, but main point is to create more private contributions. The 
interviewees are surprised the learn that research institutions take a greater role in 
research than the universities, it is the opposite it brazil. We agree that it is important 
that the private industry contribute to a greater extent. Next week innovation Norway 
and the companies from the incubator will come and make a presentation. Soft-
landing, not only for Norwegian to come to brazil but also for brazil to go to Norway. 
We speak about the potential for synergies between URFJ and innovation Norway to 
improve a better network. 
 
The cluster is officially launched now and the first meeting was held last week. So far 
ten official partners is onboard. Next step is to attract firms to participate, government 
is the driver now. How to give the directions to firm to participate?   
Due to difficulties to find a location to establish this cluster in one place, it will be a 
virtual structure, a big one. The companies will stay where they are around Rio, not in 
a physical location. It is not allowed to produce or manufacture at Ilha Fundao, only 
research and development. They are experience lots of interest from industry. Aiming 
at the whole supply chain of both SMEs and the big companies in the suppliers. Some 
of them are big, for instance FMC which are members already. Service comp and 
business companies. 
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Regarding the funding, the government try to build trust process between the 
companies in the industry as they hope think they should fund the project and not the 
state. In addition, the cluster –although not in need of much money currently- will 
search funding from all possible actors such as the development bank BNDES, 
Petrobras, FINDIP and ANP. Our science and technology system are getting stronger 
and the virtual network will ask for funding. (PROMID government program to 
improve training and educations and create more workforce, support the naval 
industry.) 
 
I ask about the interaction between the units in located on the island, namely the 
university, the member firms, Petrobras and CENPES, and the tech incubator; 
The park has contracts with the companies stating that they must invest a 
specified amount every year in the school (social activities count!), currently about 
R$300.000 per year. Annually, we decide together with the firms what projects they 
prefer to investment. The administration arrange workshops and get-togethers, 
individually with the firm (every other month) and intra-unit. It is worth noting that 
due to strict confidentiality, the meetings are often held privately with the members 
and adm, or members and UFRJ. They are currently working on improving the intra-
links, company presence, dynamics and innovative solutions. They have indicators 
which show are growth in amount invested, and for example GE invested R$12 
million over the past two years (the requirement is R&3 million per year). Yet, one 
must not forget that many of the big firms do not need the university as they are so 
established.  
HR member of members are focusing of promoting the park as “the hot spot” 
to work for the students and are currently planning “open-day” events (Parque de 
portas aberta) where all the companies are opening up for the students twice a year. 
He stresses that the staff must be increased, as there is still a lot to do and be able to 
work directly towards the students (15.000 people) and the professors (3000). 
Petrobras is very interested in having a cluster here, and also the main 
encourager. They need the suppliers, and the firms here are not competitors in that 
sense. Petrobras cannot provide all the needs in the Brazilian market. The leader of 
CENPES is also in the board of directors of the Technological park, and so they are 
very integrated in the strategy laid out by the board. One object is for example; How 
to improve our presence in subsea technology? 
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Of the six new companies, four are graded by Business Incubator Coppe / 
UFRJ and two of them are spin-off project of the University laboratories. Industrial 
focus since 50 years ago, and the URFJ developed strong ties with Petrobras. Second 
step was the incubator to facilitate for the students research and business ideas. When 
asked about the interaction with the incubator, 20 years old, ten years before the tech 
park, it is claimed that the tech park represent a natural progress from the incubator. 
Almost half of the companies are spin-offs from the incubator. 
Denise concludes that the Fundao is interesting because we have SMB, 
Petrobras the anchor companies, and the laboratory. We have everything 
 
I ask Leonardo to think of a specific technology that has been used in the Brazilian 
subsea market and led to technological development as a result of research conducted 
on “campus”. Two equipments are serving as good examples of technological 
outcomes from collaboration. FMC technology did in co-operation with the UFRJ on 
the SSO, was tested in the Labocean and was partly developed/improved on site. 
The other example is a company called Abidabi 
 
Upon asking of the time schedule for the administrator to “pull-out” of the cluster, it 
is clearly that it is not in the near future. All in all, they notice a positive change 
towards investment in innovation from the industry and improved interest for co-
operation, although slowly.  
 
Appendix 7: Interview with Jose Marcio Vasconcellos 
Representing: LabEco at the Engineer Faculty of UFRJ 
Date: April 3rd 2014 
Location: Labeco COPPE, Bloco I 205, Ilha do Fundao, RJ 
 
Summary of interview 
 
The Labeco and other labs at COPPE conducts research for the government or private 
companies, like Petrobras. Agencies such as FINEP may give money support if the 
firm applies for a research proposal. Sometimes the government comes to UFRJ and 
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asks for something that their experts see the need to do research on. He exemplifies 
that the traffic in Rio is very bad (actually the third worst in the world!), so they want 
research to be done to solve/improve this problem. 
 
In addition to this, the R&D programs may be proposed through open calls twice a 
year. If, for example the professor knows an interesting field of study, they might 
grant him money to follow his idea. The ANPs 1% pool of money can be spent on 
projects where the university cooperates with the university. 
 
He neglects that there has been a shift in favor towards R&D from the government. 
He thinks they have always has provided financial support. 
Industrially, Petrobras is the exception because they put money and that’s why they 
are in a good position in the market. He has the impression that the others firms spend 
money on R&D that they use elsewhere, or do the R&D elsewhere. Common to all is 
the desire to make money on oil, if they have to spend money on R&D to do that, they 
will.  
 
I argue that the global companies in the technology park URFJ do have R&D centers 
in all major hotspots, even in locations where it is not required. 
He replies that because the oil in brasil really belongs to petrobras, brazil differs 
distinctly from rest of the world. This scares firms from investing resources in R&D. 
if they come along for the exploration, they have to establish manufacturing because 
they are joining efforts with Petrobras. A few is not enough to create a movement.  
 
I ask what role the Labeco fill that CENPES cannot do themselves. UFRJ have 
knowledge that CENPES do not have often related to engineering, and sometimes 
they ask the university simply because they do not have time/people to do it. CENPES 
do much time consuming basic design, but their main partner is by far CENPES and 
more than 80% of their products belong to Petrobras. 
 
I ask about the intellectual property rules. A specialized contract is formed prior to the 
R&D program. The foundation takes care of this and we split with Petrobras. Register 
together, but Petro is not interested to develop this. They only need to use it to extract 
oil, they are not interested in owning or selling this patent.  
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About the Rio Subsea cluster he illustrates by saying “sometimes it is good, but not 
necessary. Sometimes it is necessary, but not good”, but he believes that it is 
necessary and that it will attract companies. He argues that Brazil and Rio can copy 
Norwegian system of cluster development, but it will not work here because we do 
not have the same people. He underlines that education is key, elementary education. 
It is a cultural problem and you can change it by education.  In general they [the 
people I assume] are looking for money for themselves, not the country. He tells a 
story about Japanese business culture shaped by the need to act self-sustainable given 
its geographical features amongst others. The message is that Japanese range the 
importance of feelings towards different institutions in the following order: The first 
priority is the country, second comes the company (Japanese people rarely switch jobs 
for instance), third family, fourth yourself. In brazil it is the exact opposite.  
 
I argue that foreign companies bring their business model so some extent, which 
might be more accustomed to R&D budgeting. He agrees and thinks that this is what 
is happening now, however very slowly. It is not easy to work together (GE and 
Petrobras example) and it is taking time.  
 
He has one example of technology developed in cooperation with Petrobras for the 
past six years, and it will soon be tried in the north of coast north of Brazil. However, 
due to security surrounding the product he cannot mention its use. He claims there is 
possibility it can be used everywhere in Brazil, and that Petrobras has no intention to 
own the patent, just employ the technology. 
 
Better co-operation may be created through general improvement in education. He 
thinks that they are currently doing well and cannot think of any specific 
improvements in communication between units. It is not long ago that industry was 
not allowed in the Ilha do Fundao, and now there is increasing interest. The main 
issue to solve the education. The continuing learning program are mostly people 
(90%) that have experience from the industry. Sometimes paid by the company. As a 
digression, He is invited to participate in Distance learning (e-learning) with students 
from Norway with connection to Huston as well. Do role in further promotion of their 
students to firms. Some student went to the techincubator and now they have their 
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own company. He assumes there exist around 20, but he doesn’t know how many 
startups died.  
 
The major importance to attract foreign companies are technology, partnership, 
experience and education. Petrobras are stimulation to get to know each other and 
attract firms because they are dependent on a supply chain. The firms establish 
centers in the tech park to stay close to the other companies. The university have 
moved the labs to the technological park, open to the firms. They actually had the first 
tank with wave maker etc. like in Trondheim, but deeper! FMC have subsea lab.  
 
FINEP has a policy if you want to get the money, you have to be associated with a 
company. Before the government gave the money directly to the university, now we 
have to be together with the companies.  
He refuses to admit that the universities are playing too big of a role in R&D in brazil, 
while also stating that they do not have research institutions.  He remembers that 
before he had to offer ideas to the companies, but now the companies come to UFRJ 
because they have seen that they can bring result important for them. He concludes 
that the activity is growing, that this is only the beginning and they are doing it 
together with the university. 
 
He said that Petrobras and FINEP are two contacts very important to get the whole 
picture.  
 
Appendix 8: Interview with Erik Hannisdal  
Representing: Inventure Management 
Date: April 14th 2014 
Location: Inventure Management’s offices in Botafogo, RJ 
 
Summary of interview 
 
Erik and his partner Jan Ramberg formed the company in 2009. From their 
experience, companies that come to Brazil spend an extensive amount money and 
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energy (especially the two first years) to understand the Brazilian business 
environment. The cost by sending one of their best expats (country manager, often 
with tech background) to open up a subsidiary and do a job that nobody can possibly 
be prepared for without being in Brazil for a long time to know its complexity. 
Inventure Management (IM) fulfills this role with a team of specialists with cultural 
knowledge and different academic/working backgrounds. Their competitors are 
similar agencies, lawyers etc, but no other have our business model of a complete 
operational platform. Inventure Management is able to build the client’s Infrastructure 
(workstations, have a industry-base in Macae (20 comp rent the place), office), offer 
administrative management (legal advice, recruitment, finance) and venture 
management specialists to close deals, create supply chain, strategy. He underlines 
that back office functions are far more demanding in Brazil and classic example is 
that everyone underestimate this segments due to poor planning. While Innovation 
Norway only acts as a facilitator and door-opener, their consultants get involved in 
the operational, and follow and establish the business hire people, move money.  
Start-ups and market penetrations experience fail to meet projected timeframe and 
cost. Therefore, one must have a administrative infrastructure to exist and you must 
have people out there to close sales. Additionally, the oil service supply chain is weak 
in brazil and more advanced planning and process management is required due to the 
fact that much equipment simply is not available in the market. The inventory costs 
are higher. This, in addition to Brazil having one of the worlds highest import tolls, 
makes an efficient supply chain management crucial to survive. To get the right 
products, to right quality at the right time is a challenge in Brazil! 
Upon being asked of possible solutions to the challenges, he claims it is just immature 
market, but developing. The key is to lower the cost on penetration and win orders by 
being smarter in other parts of the products ”price”. For instance, the benefits are 
greater if you invest more to decrease efficiency gaps in Brazil. 
 
Regarding LC, he finds it surprising that many companies do not invest more effort in 
understanding these regulations in depth. For many companies the LC is still not 
necessary, especially concerning highly specialized products, with no local 
competitors. LC represent an enormous paper-mill in collecting certificates, the 
suppliers of suppliers (3-4 links before finally give to the operator (like Statoil and 
Petrobras)) which ANP evaluates. The rules are known to everyone, framed and 
	   110	  
specified! Instead they should think “How can I maximize LC without increasing the 
price on my product?” 
Ultimately, LC has not affected the quality of the suppliers in Brazil due to the fact 
that it is only focusing on Brazilian material content in product, not giving equivalent 
credit for engineering. Gradually better, but no significant improvement. However, 
we must remember that it takes time for an industry to transform (the suppliers in 
brazil are currently not delivering to other industrial companies not oil industry). 
 
Erik applauds the dialogue between INTSOK, Innovation Norway, the consulate and 
such organizations located in Norway. They play a valuable role in fronting the 
norwegian companies abroad.   
There exists ingrown notions of what R & D can contribute to, and the 
Brazilian industry is slowly realizing that one can actually earn money from investing 
money in research! This is partly due to global companies bringing with them the 
mentality that the private sector must also contribute. In fact, there is currently a 
unique possibility to invest in R&D in Brazil because it is more funding available 
than projects at the moment. Global companies should evaluate the possibilities of 
moving its R&D operations to Brazil. For the SMB its more relevant to develop 
existing products to make it adaptable to the Brazilian market conditions. 
Sintef being the first foreign accredited research institution is a milestone. Sintef does 
not act as a public institution, nor as a private. He has no doubts that Sintef will play a 
much-needed role in the Brazilian market, even beyond the extent that Brazil realizes. 
There is a missing link in applied science in Brazil. In Norway when researched its 
ready to be launched in the value chain of the industry. The Norwegian model has 
managed to connect the research and industry closely together, while enough 
lubricating by public findings that enables us to be excellent in those areas we have 
decided to be good at. 
He thinks it is a very interesting, and a correct observation that Brazil might lack 
important cultural features important to cluster cooperation. Trust building is the 
biggest difference between norway and brazil. For Norwegians it is not natural to 
share information, and trust is easily built.. In addition, there is an element of 
organizing from the government yet to be proved. Macaé, Rio, espiritos santos – they 
all want subsea clusters, yet the obvious location is Rio. Same with shipyards, but 
result was a huge shipyard cluster in Pernambuco (north in brazil where Lula former 
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president was borne). This is part of the political game in brazil;  for PT to get enough 
votes, they must create jobs for the people in random locations. Sadly, political 
powers are pulling in different directions depending on personal interest rather than 
the nations. Three layers of power – municipal, state and federal - currently no 
conflict between federal and the state of rio, but his is first for a long time. MoU with 
Norway is a sign of ”green lights”, so it will be interesting to see the implementation 
capabilities. Erik is very pro-cluster and sees Rio Subsea cluster as positive for his 
clients and hopes that the government will implement its announced plans. IM look 
for B2B for their clients, and networking is key. 
The political landscape cannot be overseen. PT (ruling party for past 8yrs), created an 
inefficient governance and has placed political allies into the Petrobras management. 
2014 is election year, and he welcomes a political shift to at least ”pull up the roots” 
of existing proven corruption originated by the political alliances. IM has only been 
faced by corruption twice in its five year of doing business in Brazil and referred to 
their process control as ”medicine towards corruption”, at least for the petty-
corruption that can be found in some public institutions. IM has a clear anti-
corruption policy implemented. Following this, the source of corruption is slowly 
strangled. IM applied anti-corruption program influenced by Statoil’s ethical program 
and he believed that taking this stand will show benefits in the long run.  
IM experience that demand from Norwegian companies decreased from 4-5 years 
ago, but equally many clients/projects are closing new deals. The businesses are more 
realistic and are more prepared when searching for advice.  Much to be criticized in 
Brazil, still he is positive toward the future in brazil. Despite all the efficiency gaps, it 
is ”relatively” efficient because there are some giant fields in Brazil, and the 
development cost the field will therefore be offset by the upside potential.  It is the 
largest offshore market in the world, larger than Norway and the offshore industry 
should position themselves towards the opportunities. Brazil is the best match in the 
world for where Norwegian supplier can deliver what we are best at: offshore & 
subsea. Only solution is to manage the transition, and the firms that break the code 
how to operate here will have huge potential. 
The main threat is a drop in the oil price. 
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Appendix 9: Interview with Helge Austbø  
Representing: DOF Subsea 
Date: May 14th 2014 
Location: Skype 
 
Summary of interview 
 
Establishmentt in Brazil was originally through the supply unit. The current leader in 
2000-2001 observed declining oil production in Norway at a time of oil discoveries 
were happening in brazil. The prediction was that the Brazilian offshore market would 
pass Norway and DOF’s long-term commitment in Brazil is a result of strategic 
thinking. 
 
Upon entering Brazil, DOF already had 20 years of industry experience from the 
North Sea and was an international competitive company working on international 
standards. Brazil was a very immature market with few established companies and 
DOF has a competitive advantage in basically everything we offer.  Systems, ship 
designs that were developed in collaborated with Norwegian suppliers – several types 
of technology and knowledge were brought to Brazil. He describes the market as 
much more mature now, but reminds met hat 25 % of offshore vessels is still 
Norwegian owned. Offshore companies locally have Norway as a model and claims 
that Norwegian offshore companies are outstanding, if not the best. Norway is very 
prominent and very present in Rio. 
 
The experience from operating in Brazil have very limited utility value elsewhere – 
perhaps in Argentina. Everything is operated very different and he is not sure if it is 
valuable. Technology is largely transferred from our international operations to 
Brazil, and much less the other way around. Brazil has a lot to learn from Norwegian 
companies, ex. the Norwegian experience in operating vessels.  
 Technological requirements are very high because of the challenging depth of the 
water, but most of the tech developed internationally and in Norway.  
He adds that Petrobras uses contract setup very differently, which makes working 
with them very different than other international operators.  
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We go on to speak about the level of absorption of knowledge in Brazil. DOF is 
largely an operator (service provider), and does not produce or develop technology. 
Their suppliers on the other hand, are bringing technological solutions and equipment. 
One must remember that the industry is highly international – as is the technology – 
often tried out in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea and Asia.  
 
DOF established in Brazil relatively early and have therefore been prominent part of 
the industry development.  DOF has office/operation (purchase, logistics, crew 
coordinators) in Rio and Macaé, established warehouse, extensive experience of 
building boats in Brazil etc. On pressure from DOF, suppliers have opened training 
centers etc. Even so, the value chain has developed too slow - many have now 
established units with warehoused, but the chain is fairly weak.  
 
Amongst the biggest challenges faced in Brazil he mentions bureaucracy first. The 
complexity of the tax model, Customs systems, large inventory cost due to the 
number of days to get supplies ten bras : far away and complicated system. Importing 
imply severe challenges. Lack of expertise (off and onshore): engineers, lack of 
expertise among sailors (no shortage of seafarers in general, but mariners with 
expertise), lack of providers struggling because they are fighting the same struggle: to 
get hold of competence! Consequently, the Brazilian cost is extreme. The bottlenecks 
are caused by a nascent maritime industry and low level of education.  
 
He is convinced that LC helps to force the industry to establish itself permanent in 
Brazil. It does help bras to get a bras industry that works in bras with bras people. 
However, he criticizes LC for being so demanding that it contributes to cost pressures 
that are devastating for industry. It seems that the policies are not flexible enough. 
Gap between what is required in the LC and the present availability → resource 
pressures. There are not enough capacity to build all the yards that we need to build, 
and there is not enough people to do it.  it we will not no ears enough to do what we 
should. LC is an important tool as a basic.   
 
He points out that LC is resulting in training centers being built. DOF do not conduct 
research in brazil, keeping in mind that its not really relevant to their core business. 12 
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vessels are built and operating in Brazil - 100 % Brazilian crew! Need training to be 
able to use the equipment provided by our suppliers. DOF are renting spaces in 
training centers from companies such as Falk, Nutec, RR, (Kongsberg has something 
similar) provides us space. They even sent Brazilians to their training center in 
Kongsberg, as well as to Denmark. Local facilities in rio are improving which 
simplifies the process. SINTEF work with ship association on a project.  To establish 
its own training facilities is a matter of ongoing assessment, but currently no concrete 
plans ... 
 
All global suppliers are delivering to brazil, a limited amount is established in Brazil, 
and very few manufactures in brazil. What does it take to create a sustainable subsea 
supplier base in Rio? Large investments as they must have production facility in bras 
- and engineer competence. He claims that the hinder is that everyone is afraid of not 
getting the same quality of the equipment if produced locally. Greater risk for the 
buyers, as well as the suppliers. ”Building producing in Brazil is a risky sport!” 
Very technology intensive solutions lay far, far ahead in the future. He exemplifies 
that ROV (advanced technology) will most likely not be manufactured in Brazil for a 
long time, but less high-tech systems applied in ROV might be a possibility to 
produce locally.  
 
All suppliers are regularly evaluating this matter. DOF is pushing, but it is not sure 
that it beneficial for DOF as the quality will most likely be reduced as a result.  
Producing in Brazil is more expensive than producing abroad. Building a shipyard in 
Norway is approximately 30-40% lower than Brazil. The calculation on the finished 
products add up by high tax rates, lower labor efficiency, plus the struggling to find 
expertise that makes it even less effective.  
 
Again, import and customs regimes cause challenges to lean processes. Very 
expensive for suppliers to order the goods, and very expensive for us to buy the taxed 
goods. Equipment must be booked in other factories and storing is not preferred as 
tariffs are larger if one does not know what boat it will be applied.  
Without vessel (full tax), to specified vessel (less tax), however only to be used on 
that vessel!  
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Short term, the most relevant issue to resolve for DOF is local delivery of spare parts. 
It is not unusual for companies to find solution with spare parts that that already are 
produced in Brazil and remove it from our customs regime. 
 
Qualifies workers are a major challenge and a scarce resource. Their senior workforce 
is generally recruited in the market. In the future it will is likely to recruit newly 
graduated engineer, depending on the progress of a potential service line. 
 
Upon being asked if there exists a subsea cluster he holds no doubts. It is absolutely a 
cluster in Rio state including Macaé and the city RJ with very much activity. The 
environment involves major professional players within subsea sector, several 
providers of services and equipment, and more are joining us. 
 
Its parent company DOF ASA is a member in NCE Subsea in Bergen. Austbø argues 
that if may even more beneficial for engagement in Rio subsea cluster due to the fact 
that the unit has links with NCE subsea. However, it has never been a subject of 
conversation with the HQ in Norway and he is unsure regarding its extent of 
participation and what it has meant to DOF as a company. They have been in contact 
with NCE subsea when their delegation has visited Rio.  
 
They have been given information by NCE subsea, but no cooperation is engaged. He 
observes that it might be sensible to that NCE together with Innovation Norway try to 
link up towards Rio.  
 
Taking part in Rio Subsea cluster is principally of interest. At this point it is irrelevant 
to take a stand on this issue as neither motive or goal are defined. He has some 
concerns on the level of prioritization it will be given, as things often are approached 
less practically. DOF is actively participating in several organizations here in Rio and 
must consider what is worthwhile. Among their Memberships are ABA (the brazilian 
shipowners’ org), NBCC, ship owners’ association, both Brazil and Norway. His 
impression is that Associations may have a tendency of being more disciplined, 
coherent, well planned with less distance between the organizations’ members and the 
political apparatus. Tend to be more a platform for discussions and less committed to 
the resolutions.  
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The Norwegian support apparatus in Rio is very valuable. It provides a network for 
discussion viable for new arrivals and established.  The forum is being used to 
announce issues of political art allowing Norwegian ministers visiting Rio to create 
political pressure in Norway. it is important to have a Norwegian network in a market 
of such importance to Norway as Rio is. DOF is not direct in BN21, but hold 
positions in boards participating and hence provided input to the strategy formation. 
 
 
Appendix 10: E-mail correspondence with Audun Otteren 
 
Representing: NCE Subsea 
Date: May 25th 2014 
 
1. In NCE Subsea cluster, is it the industry or the academia (HiB, Sintef etc.) that 
is the major driving force behind the research?  
 
The short and general answer is that NCE Subsea trying to promote cooperation 
between research institutions and businesses through various initiatives, such as 
preliminary support for project creation and collaborative projects, seminars and 
conferences on research and technology challenges, consultancy to the establishment 
of joint projects and help to find funding for R&D and technology development. 
Specifically is R & D and technology development happening on several levels: 
further development of its own technology in each company or business cooperation 
(with or without public R & D support), through collaborations with research 
institutions (initiated by companies or research institutes) or longer-term R & D 
projects initiated by research institutions funded by public research funding and / or 
industry / companies. We are talking about technology / applied research. The 
initiator and the driving force in NCE Subsea is essentially the industry itself, but with 
significant research contributions from departments and with part-funding from the 
public institutions (Innovation Norway, the Research Council and others) 
 
2. With reference to the Breakfast Seminar: “Market Opportunities in Brazil”. Is 
NCE Subsea experiencing much interest from its members to enter the 
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Brazilian market? I notice that the focus is on export opportunities, is export a 
more appropriate for the SMEs in NCE Subsea than to establish operations in 
Brazil, or possible production units if necessary? 
 
The general answer is that there is considerable interest in exports and the 
establishment in international markets among our member companies, and Brazil is of 
course one of the very relevant (due to the large subsea activities offshore Brazil). But 
we have the member companies with less than five employees up to large subsea 
supplier companies such as FMC, Aker Solutions, Subsea One, DOF Subsea etc. 
already international and established in Brazil. For the smaller and medium sized 
companies (which are not there already), it is obviously of great interest to explore the 
potential both for export and for establishing product/service production/delivery. But 
this is clearly a major investment and a long-term commitment and should be 
conducted in a network / collaboration with other companies and public institutions. It 
will be mostly dependent on the company's product and market strategy how the 
entrance will be. 
 
 
